Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
One API Calling GenAI
v1.0.2Unified interface for all providers and all modalities: use the `genai-calling` skill to operate the published `genai-calling` CLI/SDK across text/image/audi...
⭐ 0· 153·0 current·0 all-time
MIT-0
Download zip
LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The name/description (a unified multi-provider GenAI CLI/SDK) aligns with the instructions which expect provider API keys and show example commands. However the registry metadata declares no required environment variables or credentials even though SKILL.md clearly documents many sensitive provider variables and config files — this metadata mismatch is noteworthy.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs the agent/user to create and use project-local .env.* files and a user-wide ~/.genai-calling/.env (reads/writes in the user's home), to pass provider API keys (OPENAI_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, etc.), to allow downloading arbitrary URLs (configurable, including an option to allow private/loopback URLs), and to optionally run an MCP server with bearer tokens and public base URL. These operations can expose sensitive credentials and permit internal-network access (SSRF-like risk) if misconfigured. The instructions also suggest running `pip install genai-calling`, which pulls code from PyPI (or another source) for execution.
Install Mechanism
The skill bundle itself has no install spec (instruction-only), which is lower surface risk. But SKILL.md recommends installing an external Python package (`genai-calling`) via pip if `uvx` is unavailable. Installing that package executes third-party code; the registry does not provide a homepage or source repo to verify the package before installation, increasing risk.
Credentials
The documented runtime clearly requires multiple provider API keys and optional MCP bearer tokens; that is proportionate to a multi-provider CLI. But the registry declared no required environment variables, which is inconsistent and may mislead users. The skill also reads user-wide config (~/.genai-calling/.env), which could aggregate credentials from other projects — a privacy/credential-exposure concern.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false (good). The instructions recommend creating/writing files under the skill directory and ~/.genai-calling/.env (persistent data on the user's machine). The MCP server feature could open a local listening port and expose a public base URL if configured — useful for legitimate use but potentially risky if misconfigured. The skill does not request system-wide skill-modifying privileges in the metadata.
What to consider before installing
What to consider before installing/using:
- Metadata mismatch: the registry lists no required env vars, but SKILL.md expects many sensitive provider keys and config files — ask for the source repo or homepage to verify origin.
- Inspect the package before pip installing: the docs recommend `pip install genai-calling`; verify the PyPI project, source repository, and readable code before executing third-party code.
- Protect credentials: store only the minimal provider keys you need. Prefer project-scoped keys and avoid placing long-lived/high-privilege keys in shared ~/.genai-calling/.env.
- Beware of private-URL downloads: enabling GENAI_CALLING_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS or allowing arbitrary URL downloads can let the tool access internal network addresses (SSRF-like risk). Disable unless you understand the consequences.
- MCP server caution: starting the MCP server can expose local services or accept remote requests if misconfigured (GENAI_CALLING_MCP_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, bearer tokens). Do not enable public exposure without reviewing config and firewall rules.
- Use isolation: test the tool in an isolated environment (VM/container) and with low-privilege credentials before enabling it in production.
- Source provenance: ask the publisher for a homepage/source repo and for the PyPI package name and checksum. If they cannot provide verifiable source, treat the package as higher risk.
If you can provide the package name on PyPI or a source repository link, I can re-evaluate with higher confidence. If you need a checklist for safe inspection steps (pip metadata, file listing, quick code scan), tell me which environment you'll run in and I can provide one.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
latestvk978n1httnknvt1kp5pcg6x0sd835mwd
License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
