Tines

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate Tines integration, but it gives an agent broad authenticated power to change or delete Tines resources without clear approval guardrails.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the agent delegated access to Tines through Membrane. Use a least-privileged Tines account, review and revoke Membrane connection permissions when no longer needed, prefer listed Membrane actions over raw proxy requests, and require explicit approval before any create, update, delete, credential, webhook, user, or workflow-changing operation.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The proxy request section enables arbitrary authenticated API calls, including potentially destructive POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE operations, but does not warn the agent to confirm with the user before modifying or deleting Tines data. In an agent setting, this omission increases the chance of unintended state-changing actions against production workflows, credentials, webhooks, or records.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal