MCP协议配置

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a disclosed MCP guidance skill with some powerful integration examples, but no evidence of hidden, destructive, or deceptive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable reviewing the MCP servers you enable. Prefer least-privilege filesystem paths, narrow GitHub/API token scopes, and consider installing uv through a package manager or by inspecting the installer instead of piping remote code directly into a shell.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly recommends network-connected and file-system-capable MCP servers such as web search and filesystem tools, but provides no warning about data exposure, permission scope, or the risk of unintended system changes. In an agent-skill context, this omission can lead users to connect powerful external tools without understanding privacy, exfiltration, or host-impact risks.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal