SSH Tunnel
AdvisoryAudited by Static analysis on Apr 30, 2026.
Overview
No suspicious patterns detected.
Findings (0)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
A mistaken command could make a local service reachable from a remote network or reduce protection against connecting to the wrong SSH host.
The skill documents binding a remote tunnel to all interfaces and disabling SSH host-key checking. These are SSH-related and disclosed, but can expose a local service or weaken MITM protection if copied without understanding.
ssh -R 0.0.0.0:8080:localhost:3000 user@remote-server ... StrictHostKeyChecking no
Prefer localhost-only forwards unless public exposure is intentional, and avoid disabling StrictHostKeyChecking except for clearly understood temporary/dev cases.
Running these commands can grant future SSH access to a remote account or let a trusted remote host use your local SSH agent while the session is active.
The skill includes examples for adding SSH public keys to remote authorized_keys and forwarding the local SSH agent. These are expected for SSH administration, but they affect account access and credential delegation.
cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ... ssh -A user@remote-server ... SECURITY: only forward to trusted hosts
Only deploy keys to accounts you control, use passphrases where practical, and use agent forwarding only with hosts you trust.
A tunnel or master connection may continue running in the background and keep access to internal services available.
The skill documents background SSH tunnels and persistent multiplexed connections. This is normal SSH tunneling behavior, but it can keep network access open after the command is started.
ssh -fNL 5432:db.internal:5432 user@remote-server # -f = background after auth ... ControlPersist 600
Track background SSH sessions and stop them when finished, for example with ssh -O stop/exit or by terminating the SSH process.