AtroSnow File Management

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only developer guide for an application file-management workflow, with one confirmed inconsistency but no hidden execution or credential-stealing behavior.

Safe to install as a reference guide, but users should treat the final saveFileMediaFile workflow cautiously. For business modules, prefer the documented service-layer createFileMedia pattern and verify authorization, validation, audit logging, and file lifecycle handling in the actual application.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill gives contradictory guidance: earlier sections correctly say business services should formalize files via createFileMedia inside the service layer, but the later '完整开发流程' says to call the async /filemedia/b/saveFileMediaFile endpoint for that step. In a file-management workflow, this inconsistency can cause developers to implement the wrong path, bypass intended service-layer controls, introduce authorization/state-management mistakes, and create orphaned or improperly linked files.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal