FBoxCLI

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent FBox industrial IoT CLI guide, but it needs review because it can change device/control/alarm state and its credential and confirmation guidance is incomplete.

Install only if you trust the fboxcli package and intend to let an agent assist with industrial IoT operations. Use least-privilege FBox credentials, avoid passing passwords directly in commands or scripts, verify device IDs and target values carefully, and require explicit confirmation for every operation that changes devices, monitoring points, contacts, alarms, data push, history, or write groups.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (7)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

Confidence: 86% confidence
Finding: The documentation exposes a destructive `dmon delete` capability for removing monitoring points, while the skill description emphasizes device management, monitoring, read/write point data, alarms, history, grouping, and bulk operations—not deletion of monitoring definitions. In an industrial IoT context, deleting monitoring points can impair observability, break automation workflows, and hinder alarming or operator awareness, making this more dangerous than a typical admin convenience command.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The installation guide recommends password-based login via a CLI flag (`-p YOUR_PASSWORD`), which encourages users to place credentials directly on the command line. Command-line arguments are commonly exposed through shell history, process listings, logging, and terminal recordings, creating a realistic credential leakage risk. In the context of an industrial IoT device management CLI, stolen credentials could grant access to device data and management operations, increasing the severity of mishandling.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 96% confidence
Finding: The README demonstrates `fboxcli auth login -u user@example.com -p password`, which exposes credentials via shell history, process listings, audit logs, and CI job output. In this skill's context, the risk is heightened because it targets automation and industrial IoT operations, where reused or privileged credentials could grant access to device management, monitoring, and control functions.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The trigger description includes broad terms such as CLI scripts, automation operations, and bulk device operations, which can cause the skill to activate in contexts not specifically about FBox. Because this skill can guide or perform sensitive industrial IoT management actions, accidental invocation increases the chance of exposing device information or initiating risky operational workflows in the wrong context.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The documented `contact list` and `contact get` commands expose personally identifiable information such as email addresses and phone numbers, but the documentation does not flag that this data is sensitive or recommend access controls, minimization, or careful handling. In an industrial IoT operations context, operator and escalation contact data can be used for phishing, social engineering, or privacy violations if broadly exposed or mishandled.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: The `contact add` and `contact update` commands perform write operations on personal contact information, but the documentation does not warn about privacy implications, authorization requirements, or the risk of modifying notification recipients incorrectly. In this skill's alarm-management context, unauthorized or careless changes could both mishandle PII and disrupt operational alerting by altering who receives alarms.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The documentation shows `fboxcli box add <BOX_NO> <PASSWORD>` with an example that passes the device password directly on the command line. Command-line arguments are commonly exposed through shell history, process listings, audit logs, CI logs, and terminal recordings, so this encourages insecure credential handling. In an industrial device-management context, leaked FBox credentials could enable unauthorized device enrollment or administration.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal