Hummingbot Developer

SuspiciousAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.

Overview

The skill mostly matches a Hummingbot developer setup workflow, but it includes high-impact local installers and a sourced branch config that could execute unintended commands.

Install only in a trusted, isolated development environment. Review install_deps.sh before running it, avoid untrusted branch names or edited .dev-branches files, keep services bound to localhost, change default credentials if anything is exposed, and stop the dev stack when finished.

Findings (6)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

Running install-deps can execute code fetched from remote installer endpoints and make broad changes to the local machine.

Why it was flagged

The dependency installer executes remote installer scripts directly and uses latest/unverified downloads, which is high-impact supply-chain exposure even though installing developer dependencies is purpose-aligned.

Skill content
/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)" ... curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bash ... curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
Recommendation

Inspect the installer first, prefer package-manager or pinned/checksummed installs, and run it only in a trusted development environment.

ConcernMedium Confidence
ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution
What this means

A malicious or tampered branch-selection file could run local commands when the skill installs or builds the project.

Why it was flagged

Branch names are written into a shell file without quoting or escaping, and other provided scripts source this .dev-branches file; a poisoned file or crafted branch value could execute shell syntax during later install/build runs.

Skill content
cat > "$WORKSPACE/.dev-branches" << EOF
HBOT_BRANCH=$HBOT_BRANCH
GATEWAY_BRANCH=$GATEWAY_BRANCH
API_BRANCH=$API_BRANCH
EOF
Recommendation

Do not source untrusted workspace files; write branch values with shell-safe quoting, validate branch names strictly, or store them in a non-executable format such as JSON.

What this means

Stopping or restarting the dev stack could accidentally terminate another Node or uvicorn process on the same machine.

Why it was flagged

The stop/start workflow uses broad process-pattern kills rather than only the PID file it creates, which is purpose-related but could affect unrelated local processes matching those strings.

Skill content
pkill -f "dist/index.js" 2>/dev/null && ok "Gateway stopped" ... pkill -f "uvicorn main:app" 2>/dev/null && ok "API stopped"
Recommendation

Run this in an isolated dev environment and prefer stopping only PIDs recorded by the script.

What this means

If the API, broker, or database is exposed outside localhost, default credentials could allow unauthorized access.

Why it was flagged

The script writes default local development credentials into the API .env file. This is disclosed dev setup behavior, but the credentials are weak and should not be used beyond a local trusted environment.

Skill content
USERNAME=admin
PASSWORD=admin
CONFIG_PASSWORD=admin
BROKER_USERNAME=admin
BROKER_PASSWORD=password
Recommendation

Change generated passwords before exposing any service to a network, and keep this setup local-only.

What this means

Credentials may be sent to a configured API endpoint; this is safe only when the endpoint is local or otherwise trusted.

Why it was flagged

The integration test sends Basic Auth credentials to the configured API URL. The default is localhost and fits the dev purpose, but changing the URL could send credentials over plain HTTP.

Skill content
API_URL = os.environ.get("HUMMINGBOT_API_URL", "http://localhost:8000") ... req.add_header("Authorization", f"Basic {creds}")
Recommendation

Keep HUMMINGBOT_API_URL on localhost for dev testing, or use HTTPS and non-default credentials for remote endpoints.

NoteHigh Confidence
ASI10: Rogue Agents
What this means

Gateway can keep running after the command returns unless the user stops the dev stack.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally starts Gateway as a background process and logs it under the workspace. This is disclosed and has a stop command, but it is persistent local activity users should notice.

Skill content
nohup node dist/index.js --passphrase="$PASSPHRASE" --dev > "$GW_LOG" 2>&1 &
Recommendation

Use `bash scripts/run_dev_stack.sh --status` and `bash scripts/run_dev_stack.sh --stop` when done.