Agent Trust Protocol

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly aligned with local trust tracking, but its Moltbook bridge can build shell commands from usernames or post IDs, which could let crafted input run local commands.

Review the code before installing, especially moltbook_trust.py. Avoid using Moltbook bridge commands with untrusted names, domains, or post IDs until shell command construction is fixed. If you use the skill, periodically inspect ~/.atp and run the dashboard only when needed.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

#
ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution
High
What this means

A crafted Moltbook username, domain, or post ID could cause the user's machine to run commands outside the intended trust lookup workflow.

Why it was flagged

The script interpolates username, domain, and post_id values into shell commands. If those values contain shell metacharacters, running the bridge can execute unintended local commands.

Skill content
result = subprocess.run(f"python3 {ATP_PY} {args}", shell=True, ...); score_out = atp_cmd(f"trust score {username}{domain_flag}"); ... subprocess.run(f"python3 {moltbook_py} post {post_id}", shell=True, ...)
Recommendation

Do not pass untrusted values to moltbook_trust.py until it replaces shell=True with argument arrays, validates identifiers, or safely quotes all inputs.

#
ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Low
What this means

Incorrect, demo, or tampered trust entries may persist and influence future trust reports.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally stores trust scores and interaction history in persistent local files, which can affect later agent trust decisions.

Skill content
ATP_DIR = Path.home() / ".atp"; TRUST_DB = ATP_DIR / "trust.json"; INTERACTIONS_DB = ATP_DIR / "interactions.jsonl"; ... TRUST_DB.write_text(json.dumps(db, indent=2))
Recommendation

Review ~/.atp before relying on the trust graph, back it up if important, and remove or correct entries created during testing.

#
ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Low
What this means

Other local processes or browser contexts on the same machine may be able to request the trust dashboard data while it is running.

Why it was flagged

The dashboard exposes trust and interaction data through unauthenticated localhost HTTP endpoints while the server is running.

Skill content
if self.path == "/api/trust": ... elif self.path == "/api/interactions": ... server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", PORT), ATPHandler)
Recommendation

Run the dashboard only when needed, keep it bound to 127.0.0.1, and avoid storing sensitive notes in interaction records.

#
ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Low
What this means

The installed behavior could vary over time if the remote dependency changes.

Why it was flagged

The package references a GitHub dependency without a pinned version or commit, so installations using package.json could pull changing external code.

Skill content
"dependencies": { "skillsign": "https://github.com/FELMONON/skillsign" }
Recommendation

Review and pin the skillsign dependency to a specific commit before installing through a package manager.

#
ASI09: Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
Low
What this means

Users may believe Moltbook identity verification is available when the included bridge does not appear to implement that command.

Why it was flagged

The bridge tells users to run a verify command, but the visible command dispatcher handles link, lookup, score, scan-post, and leaderboard, not verify.

Skill content
print(f"  Run 'moltbook_trust.py verify {username}' to verify via challenge-response") ... elif cmd == "leaderboard": cmd_leaderboard() else: print(__doc__)
Recommendation

Treat Moltbook links as unverified unless a working verification command is added and tested.