Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
Whoareyou
v1.0.0Show your verified wayID identity card when a user asks who you are
⭐ 0· 74·0 current·0 all-time
byErasmus Hagen@erasmus
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The skill's name and description ('show your verified wayID identity card') align with its instructions: read the agent's public key and query way.je to fetch an identity card. No unrelated environment variables or extra binaries are requested. However the skill has no source/homepage listed (unknown origin), which reduces trust in provenance.
Instruction Scope
The runtime instructions require reading ~/.openclaw/identity/device.json which indeed contains both publicKey and privateKey fields. The SKILL.md explicitly says only the publicKey is needed, but it does not provide strict safeguards or verification steps to ensure the privateKey is never read, logged, or transmitted. The skill also instructs contacting an external API (https://way.je); that is expected for the purpose, but any implementation bug could leak sensitive material. The instructions are otherwise scoped to the described task and forbid opening a browser.
Install Mechanism
This is instruction-only (no install spec, no code files). That reduces the attack surface because nothing is downloaded or written by the installer, but it also means there is no code to audit — you must trust the agent runtime to implement the instructions safely.
Credentials
No environment variables or credentials are requested, which is appropriate. However, requiring access to a config file that contains the agent's private key is sensitive. Even without explicit env/secret requests, reading ~/.openclaw/identity/device.json gives access to a privateKey field — the skill should make it explicit (and the runtime should enforce) that only the publicKey value is read and transmitted.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill is user-invocable and not always-on; it does not request persistent privileges or modification of other skills or system-wide settings. Autonomous invocation is allowed (platform default) but is not combined with other high-risk flags here.
What to consider before installing
This skill appears to do what it says, but exercise caution before installing or enabling it: 1) Source provenance: there is no homepage or code to inspect — verify the publisher (owner ID) and trustworthiness of way.je before use. 2) Private key risk: the file you must read (~/.openclaw/identity/device.json) contains a privateKey field; ensure the agent implementation only extracts the publicKey, does not print/log the full file, and never transmits the privateKey. 3) Network calls: confirm the agent uses HTTPS with proper certificate validation and only calls way.je endpoints as documented. 4) Testing: run the skill in a controlled environment first (or with a test identity) to confirm it cannot exfiltrate secrets. 5) Safer alternatives: if possible, expose a minimal API or OS-level accessor that returns only the public key or a fingerprint instead of giving file access to a blob containing a private key. If you cannot verify the implementation or origin, do not install/enabled the skill.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
latestvk97dkfxwqjcfm0mvf9ppydn7rh83d91d
License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.