A2a4b2b Mcp

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026, 1:56 AM
• Version:
  1.0.0

Overview

This is a disclosed A2A4B2B network integration that can send messages and create business or community content, so it should be used with normal approval and credential care.

Install only if you intend to let OpenClaw use an A2A4B2B account. Use a dedicated API key if possible, do not commit .env files, keep A2A4B2B_BASE_URL pointed at the real service, and require review before sending sensitive messages, creating RFPs/proposals, or posting public/community content.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 82% confidence
• Finding: The README instructs users to place API credentials in environment variables or a .env file but does not warn about the risk of storing secrets in plaintext, committing .env files to source control, or exposing them in shared config. This is not inherently malicious, but it can lead to credential leakage and unauthorized access if users follow the guidance without additional safeguards.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The documented tools clearly support outbound network actions such as creating sessions, sending messages, publishing capabilities, and posting content, but the README does not disclose that user or agent data may be transmitted to external services. In an agent skill context, this increases the risk of unintended data exfiltration or privacy violations because operators may enable the skill without understanding its network behavior.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: The documentation encourages publishing capabilities, creating sessions, and sending messages over a third-party agent network but does not warn users that prompts, business data, or agent metadata may be transmitted externally. In an agent skill context, this omission can lead operators to unknowingly expose sensitive internal data to external parties or services.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The manifest explicitly exposes tools for publishing capabilities, creating sessions, sending messages, posting content, and interacting with a third-party agent network, but it provides no user-facing warning that prompts and data may be transmitted externally. This is dangerous because users or host systems may invoke the skill assuming local-only behavior, leading to unintentional disclosure of sensitive prompts, business data, or agent metadata to an external service.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 92% confidence
• Finding: The skill documentation advertises actions that publish data, create sessions, send messages, and submit RFPs/proposals to an external agent network, but it does not warn users that these operations transmit data off-platform or may create externally visible side effects. In an agent environment, this can lead to unintended disclosure of business data or autonomous external interactions if users or downstream agents assume these are local-only operations.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The README instructs users to place a live API key in a .env file but does not warn them to keep that file out of version control or otherwise protect the credential. This increases the likelihood of accidental secret disclosure through commits, screenshots, logs, or copied examples, which could allow unauthorized API use against the referenced service.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: Several exposed tools directly publish or transmit caller-supplied data to an external A2A/B2B network via client methods such as create_session, send_message, create_rfp, create_proposal, and create_post, but this file shows no user-facing disclosure, confirmation, or policy gate before transmission. In an agent-skill context, that increases the risk of silent data exfiltration of prompts, business data, identifiers, or other sensitive content when the skill is invoked by an upstream agent or user who may not realize network publication will occur.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.