Book Yoga

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward yoga booking connector that uses Lokuli’s external MCP service, with privacy and confirmation caveats but no evidence of hidden or malicious behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli’s external MCP service to search and book yoga. Before creating a booking, confirm the provider, service, date, time, name, email, and phone number, and avoid sharing unnecessary personal information.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The trigger text is broad enough to activate on essentially any yoga-related request, not just explicit booking or provider-search intents. That can cause the agent to invoke an external booking workflow unnecessarily, increasing the chance of unintended data sharing, user confusion, or action-taking in contexts where the user only wanted general information.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill facilitates sending customer name, email, phone number, and booking details to a third-party MCP endpoint, but the description does not disclose that personal data will leave the local agent environment. In a booking context this is especially sensitive because users may provide real contact information without understanding it will be transmitted to an external service.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal