Book Tree Service

PassAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.

Overview

This looks like a normal tree-service booking helper, but it can send your contact details to Lokuli and create an appointment, so confirm details before booking.

This skill appears coherent for booking tree-service appointments. Install it only if you trust Lokuli, and do not let the agent complete create_booking until you have reviewed and confirmed the provider, time slot, and contact information.

Findings (3)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

Low

#ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation

What this means

If used with the wrong provider, time, or contact details, the user could accidentally schedule a real service appointment.

Why it was flagged

The skill documents a tool that can create an external booking using customer contact details. This is aligned with the stated booking purpose, but it is a user-impacting action.

Skill content

"name": "create_booking", "arguments": { "providerId": "xxx", "serviceId": "yyy", "timeSlot": "2025-02-10T14:00:00-08:00", "customerName": "John Doe", "customerEmail": "john@example.com", "customerPhone": "+13105551234" }

Recommendation

Require the user to confirm provider, service, date, time, contact details, and any cost or cancellation terms before calling create_booking.

Low

#ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication

What this means

The user's booking and contact information may be sent to Lokuli's MCP service.

Why it was flagged

The skill routes search, availability, and booking calls through a remote MCP endpoint. The booking example includes name, email, and phone, so this creates an external data-sharing boundary.

Skill content

## MCP Endpoint
```
https://lokuli.com/mcp/sse
```

Transport: SSE | JSON-RPC 2.0 | POST requests

Recommendation

Share only information needed for the booking and use the skill only if the user trusts Lokuli and its handling of contact details.

Info

#ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

What this means

It may be harder for the user to verify who maintains the skill or the remote service it relies on.

Why it was flagged

The registry metadata does not provide a source repository or homepage. This is not evidence of malicious behavior, but it limits independent verification of the skill/provider provenance.

Skill content

Source: unknown; Homepage: none

Recommendation

Verify the Lokuli domain and provider reputation before sharing personal booking information.