Book Tattoo

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward tattoo-booking skill using a disclosed Lokuli MCP endpoint, with privacy and confirmation cautions but no evidence of hidden or harmful behavior.

Install only if you want an agent to help search and book tattoo appointments through Lokuli. Before any booking is submitted, confirm the provider, service, time slot, and that your name, email, and phone number will be sent to the external service.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The trigger text is broad enough to activate on generic tattoo-related requests such as discovery or informational queries, not just explicit booking intent. In a skill that can reach an external MCP and perform downstream service actions, overbroad routing can cause unintended invocation, unnecessary data sharing, or users being steered into transactional flows they did not request.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The skill supports create_booking with customerName, customerEmail, and customerPhone sent to a third-party MCP endpoint, but the description does not disclose that personal contact information will be transmitted externally. This weakens informed consent and increases privacy and compliance risk if users are not clearly told what data leaves the system and for what purpose.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal