Book Nutritionist

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward booking skill that uses Lokuli to find nutritionists and create appointments, with contact details shared only as part of that booking flow.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli as the external booking service. Before creating an appointment, confirm the provider, time slot, and that you want your name, email, and phone sent for the booking.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The trigger text is broad enough to activate on generic nutritionist-related requests without clear consent or scope boundaries, which can cause the agent to invoke an external booking workflow unexpectedly. In this skill, unexpected activation is more dangerous because it can lead directly to searching for providers and progressing toward transmission of user location and contact data to a third-party MCP endpoint.

Missing User Warnings

High

Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The skill includes a booking flow that transmits personal contact data such as name, email, and phone number to an external service, but it provides no user-facing warning, consent step, or data-handling notice. In this context, the risk is elevated because healthcare-adjacent appointment booking can involve sensitive inferences about a user's health interests, making silent collection and transfer of contact data particularly privacy-invasive.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal