Book Makeup

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026, 7:01 AM
• Version:
  1.0.1

Overview

This is a straightforward makeup-booking skill that uses a disclosed Lokuli endpoint, but users should confirm before sending contact details or creating an appointment.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli for makeup-service search and booking. Before creating a booking, verify the provider, service, date/time, price or cancellation terms, and exactly what name, email, and phone number will be sent.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The trigger text is broad enough to activate on nearly any makeup-related request, including informational or low-intent queries that do not clearly ask for booking. In a skill that can query an external MCP service and ultimately create bookings, overbroad activation increases the chance of unintended tool use, unnecessary data transfer, or the agent steering users into transactional flows they did not request.

Missing User Warnings

High

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs use of an external MCP endpoint and shows booking payloads containing customer name, email, and phone number, but it does not disclose to the user that this personal data will be transmitted to a third-party service. In a booking context, this omission is particularly risky because users may provide sensitive contact details without informed consent, creating privacy, compliance, and trust issues.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.