Book Language Tutor

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears intended for legitimate language-tutor booking, but it can send personal contact details and create a real booking without clear consent or final confirmation safeguards.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli for tutor booking. Before allowing create_booking, ask the agent to show the exact provider, service, date and time, contact details to be shared, price if available, and cancellation terms, then confirm explicitly.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The manifest description includes broad trigger language such as 'any language-tutor service request,' which can cause the skill to activate on loosely related user queries. Overbroad invocation increases the chance that user requests are routed to an external booking workflow without sufficiently clear user intent, leading to unnecessary exposure of search context or later collection of booking data.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill documents transmission of personal contact data including name, email, and phone number to an external MCP booking service, but it provides no warning or consent guidance before collecting and sending that information. This creates privacy and compliance risk because users may not understand that their PII will be shared with a third party during booking.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal