Volcengine

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only Volcengine guide with no installer or hidden execution, though users should handle cloud prompts and credentials carefully.

Install only if you want guidance for using Volcengine services. Before using the examples with real accounts, replace placeholder keys with environment variables or a secret manager, use least-privilege credentials, avoid sending secrets or regulated data in prompts, and require explicit confirmation before applying infrastructure or database changes.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The documentation explicitly recommends environment variables for credentials, but the sample code immediately demonstrates hardcoded access and secret keys. Even though the values are placeholders, this pattern normalizes insecure credential handling and may lead users to paste real secrets into source files, which can then be committed, logged, or shared accidentally.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 83% confidence
Finding: The example sends arbitrary user prompts to Volcengine's external MaaS API without any explicit notice that user-supplied content leaves the local system. In an agent-skill context, prompts may contain sensitive operational, customer, or credential data, so the lack of disclosure and guidance increases the risk of unintended data exfiltration to a third-party service.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal