ClawHub

ABM Outbound

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed outbound-marketing workflow, but it handles sensitive prospect data including home addresses and can add people to outreach systems without enough guardrails.

Install only if you have a clear lawful basis to collect and use prospect contact data, especially residential addresses. Prefer business contact data, avoid home-address outreach unless explicitly authorized, use restricted API keys, test with a small reviewed list, and confirm suppression, opt-out, retention, and vendor-processing requirements before adding anyone to campaigns.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (8)

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill is explicitly designed to collect and combine multiple categories of personal data—LinkedIn profile details, email addresses, phone numbers, and physical mailing addresses—and then transmit that data to several third-party vendors for outreach. It provides operational guidance for this pipeline but omits any safeguards around consent, lawful basis, privacy notice, retention, or handling of sensitive personal data, which materially increases privacy, compliance, and misuse risk.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
This section instructs users to perform skip tracing to obtain a person's mailing address and then use it for handwritten outreach, which can expose home address data and facilitate stalking, harassment, or other invasive targeting. The only validation suggested is matching state to LinkedIn location, which improves deliverability but does nothing to address privacy, consent, or safety concerns.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The outreach workflow automates sending enriched recipient data to Apollo, Instantly, and Scribeless without clearly warning users that personal information is being shared with external processors. In this context, silent transmission of contact and address data to multiple vendors increases the chance of unauthorized processing, over-sharing, and regulatory noncompliance.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
This documentation explicitly describes collecting and enriching highly sensitive personal data, including personal emails, phone numbers, and home addresses, and even highlights that the skip-trace source returns home addresses from public records. In the context of an outbound ABM skill that orchestrates direct outreach and handwritten letters, this materially increases privacy, harassment, and misuse risk, especially because there is no guidance on consent, lawful basis, minimization, retention, or restrictions on handling personal/home contact data.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Apollo: Email & Phone Enrichment

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1/people/bulk_match" \
  -H "X-Api-Key: $APOLLO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
curl -X POST "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1/people/bulk_match" \ -H "X-Api-Key: $APOLLO_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Skip Trace (Mailing Address)

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/one-api~skip-trace/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": ["John Doe"]}'
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/one-api~skip-trace/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Apollo: Email & Phone Enrichment

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1/people/bulk_match" \
  -H "X-Api-Key: $APOLLO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
https://api.apollo.io/

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Skip Trace (Mailing Address)

```bash
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/one-api~skip-trace/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": ["John Doe"]}'
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
https://api.apify.com/

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal