小米 TTS Proxy

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 at 8:36 PM UTC
• Version:
  1.0.2

Overview

This is a coherent local Xiaomi text-to-speech proxy, with expected credential and FFmpeg use, but users should protect the API key file.

Install only if you are comfortable sending TTS input text to Xiaomi or your configured upstream proxy. Store ~/.openclaw/tts-proxy.env with restrictive permissions such as chmod 600, do not commit or share it, rotate the API key if exposed, and review any systemd service you create before enabling background startup.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to place a live Xiaomi API key in a predictable local file under ~/.openclaw without any guidance to restrict permissions, avoid committing it, or use a secret store. If that file is readable by other local users, backup agents, or accidentally exposed in logs/repos, the key can be stolen and used to consume quota or access the upstream service.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.