Bring Rezepte

ReviewAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.

Overview

The skill mostly matches its Bring! recipe and shopping-list purpose, but one authenticated content-fetch path appears insufficiently bounded and should be reviewed before use.

Use this skill only if you are comfortable giving it Bring! account access. Prefer environment variables for credentials, confirm every list change, avoid arbitrary --content-url values, and only set BRING_NODE_API_PATH to trusted code.

Findings (4)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

Low

#ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse

What this means

The agent can log in to the user’s Bring! account and access or change shopping-list data during use.

Why it was flagged

The skill requires Bring! account credentials. This is expected for accessing and updating a Bring! list, but account passwords are sensitive and command-line password arguments can be more exposed than environment variables.

Skill content

- name: BRING_EMAIL ... required: true
- name: BRING_PASSWORD ... required: true
...
If ENV is not set, pass `--email` and `--password` explicitly.

Recommendation

Prefer environment variables or a secure secret store over command-line password arguments, and use an account/password you are comfortable granting to the skill.

Medium

#ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse

What this means

A malicious or mistaken content URL could receive Bring! authentication headers, potentially allowing access to the user’s shopping-list account until the token expires.

Why it was flagged

This helper sends the provided headers to whatever URL is supplied. The skill’s documented content flow uses authenticated Bring! headers, so a missing host allowlist could expose Bring! session headers if a bad content URL is passed.

Skill content

async function fetchContent(url, headers) {
  const resp = await fetch(url, { headers });

Recommendation

Validate that content URLs are under the expected Bring! API host before attaching Authorization or other Bring! headers, and strip auth headers for any non-Bring URL.

Low

#ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation

What this means

Approved actions can add items or create lists in the user’s Bring! account.

Why it was flagged

The skill can mutate a shopping list, but the instructions clearly require explicit user confirmation before adding ingredients.

Skill content

**WICHTIG: Immer explizit nach Bestätigung fragen, bevor Artikel zur Liste hinzugefügt werden!**
...
Nur bei expliziter Bestätigung: Add their ingredients

Recommendation

Before approving, check the selected recipe, ingredient list, and target Bring! list.

Low

#ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution

What this means

If BRING_NODE_API_PATH points to untrusted code, that code would run with the user’s local permissions and access to the provided Bring! credentials.

Why it was flagged

The script can load a Bring API implementation from a user-specified local path before falling back to the package dependency. This is disclosed, but any required local module executes as Node.js code.

Skill content

const envPath = process.env.BRING_NODE_API_PATH;
if (envPath) {
  return require(envPath);
}
...
return require("bring-shopping");

Recommendation

Set BRING_NODE_API_PATH only to a trusted, reviewed local file, or leave it unset to use the packaged dependency.