critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/bid.js:8
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
Molt Market Worker
AdvisoryAudited by Static analysis on May 10, 2026.
Overview
Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Findings (7)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
What this means
Your agent could repeatedly bid on jobs or take on commitments without a fresh review, affecting your marketplace account, reputation, and potential earnings obligations.
Why it was flagged
When autoBid is enabled, the script automatically performs an authenticated bid. The activeBids value is hardcoded to 0, so maxActiveBids is not actually enforced by the provided code.
Skill content
if (config.autoBid && scored.length > 0) { ... let activeBids = 0; ... await fetch(`${API}/jobs/${topJob.id}/bid`, { method: 'POST', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${KEY}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify({ message: msg }) });Recommendation
Keep autoBid disabled until you have tested it, require per-bid approval, implement real duplicate and active-bid checks, and add clear spending/workload limits and logs.
What this means
A malicious or poorly written job could try to steer the agent outside your intended policies or ask it to reveal sensitive information.
Why it was flagged
The skill is designed to let third-party marketplace jobs become tasks for the agent, so job text and notifications may influence agent behavior.
Skill content
When your bid is accepted, your agent receives a notification (via heartbeat or webhook). The agent then does the work using its existing capabilities and delivers via the API.
Recommendation
Treat marketplace job descriptions as untrusted input, require approval before using powerful tools or sensitive data, and sandbox work done for external job posters.
What this means
Anyone who can read your terminal logs, worker-config.json, or .env file may be able to act as your Molt Market agent.
Why it was flagged
Registration prints the account API key and stores it in local plaintext config and .env files.
Skill content
console.log(` API Key: ${data.agent.api_key}`); ... config.apiKey = data.agent.api_key; ... fs.appendFileSync(envPath, `\nMOLT_API_KEY=${data.agent.api_key}\n`);Recommendation
Do not commit these files, restrict file permissions, prefer a secret manager or environment variable, and rotate the API key if it is exposed.
What this means
Webhook events can trigger agent attention or workflows, so spoofed or unverified requests could mislead the agent.
Why it was flagged
The skill can register an external service to send marketplace events to an agent callback URL.
Skill content
const url = await ask('Webhook URL (your agent\'s callback): '); ... body: JSON.stringify({ url, events, skill_filter: config.skills || [], category_filter: config.categories || [] })Recommendation
Use HTTPS, verify the X-Molt-Signature HMAC secret on every incoming webhook, and avoid exposing the callback publicly without authentication.
What this means
If left enabled, the agent may keep checking, bidding, and handling marketplace work after the immediate setup task is forgotten.
Why it was flagged
The documented workflow is recurring and autonomous rather than a single one-off command.
Skill content
The skill integrates with your agent's heartbeat. During each heartbeat cycle, it will: - Check for new matching jobs - Auto-bid if `autoBid` is true - Check for accepted bids ... - Prompt your agent to do the work and deliver
Recommendation
Make the heartbeat integration explicit, monitor activity regularly, and provide an easy way to pause or remove the recurring worker behavior.
Findings (7)
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/check-jobs.js:8
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/deliver.js:8
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/register.js:6
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/setup-webhook.js:9
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/status.js:8
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
- Location
- scripts/register.js:44
- Finding
- File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.