fast-claude-code

PassAudited by VirusTotal on May 11, 2026.

Overview

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: fast-claude-code Version: 1.0.5 The skill bundle automates Claude Code tasks using tmux and background monitoring, but it employs several high-risk patterns. Most notably, it uses the `--dangerously-skip-permissions` flag in `modes/single.sh`, `modes/interactive.sh`, and `modes/team.sh`, which allows the underlying AI agent to execute arbitrary shell commands without user confirmation. Furthermore, `modes/team.sh` dynamically modifies the local `.claude/settings.json` to install a custom shell hook (`.claude/hooks/on-stop.sh`) that executes upon task completion. While these behaviors are technically aligned with the stated goal of 'Fast' background automation, the combination of unmediated tool execution, modification of local configuration files, and the use of external callbacks (webhooks, ntfy) creates a significant security risk and a broad attack surface for potential prompt injection.

Findings (0)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

Claude Code may edit files or run tools for the requested task without asking for each individual approval.

Why it was flagged

The default mode runs Claude Code with permission checks skipped; the script also starts it in the background and triggers callbacks after completion.

Skill content
PERMISSION_MODE="auto" ... CLAUDE_CMD="claude -p --dangerously-skip-permissions"
Recommendation

Use `--permission-mode plan` by default, reserve auto mode for trusted repositories, and confirm the exact project path before running.

What this means

A long-running interactive Claude session can continue operating with elevated tool autonomy after the initial launch.

Why it was flagged

Interactive mode not only uses skipped permissions in auto mode, it programmatically accepts Claude Code's dangerous-permissions warning.

Skill content
CLAUDE_CMD="claude --dangerously-skip-permissions" ... log_info "Auto-accepting dangerous permissions warning..." ... tmux -L cc send-keys -t "$SESSION" 2
Recommendation

Do not auto-accept dangerous permission prompts; require explicit user confirmation or default interactive sessions to plan mode.

ConcernHigh Confidence
ASI08: Cascading Failures
What this means

Running Team mode may change how future Claude Code sessions behave in that project and may remove previously configured Stop hooks.

Why it was flagged

Team mode replaces the project's entire Claude Code Stop hook array rather than only adding its own hook, which can disrupt existing project automation or safety hooks.

Skill content
# Settings file exists, merge Stop hook (replace entire Stop array)
jq --argjson newHooks "$HOOKS_CONFIG" '
    .hooks = (.hooks // {}) |
    .hooks.Stop = $newHooks.Stop
    ' "$SETTINGS_FILE"
Recommendation

Preserve existing hooks, add a namespaced hook entry instead of replacing the Stop array, and show users exactly what will change.

NoteHigh Confidence
ASI10: Rogue Agents
What this means

Claude Code work may continue after the initiating command returns, until the task completes, times out, or the session is closed.

Why it was flagged

Background tmux execution and long-running interactive sessions are disclosed and central to the skill, but they are persistent local agent activity the user should monitor.

Skill content
任务在后台 tmux 会话中运行,完成后自动回调 ... Interactive 模式 - 长时运行任务、需要多轮对话
Recommendation

Review active tmux sessions, close interactive sessions when done, and avoid running multiple high-impact tasks in the same project.

What this means

Task descriptions, summaries, filenames, or code-related output can be sent outside the local machine when webhook callbacks are used.

Why it was flagged

The webhook callback sends the user task and Claude output to a configured HTTP endpoint; this is purpose-aligned callback behavior but may include sensitive project information.

Skill content
"message": "$MESSAGE_JSON",
"output": "$OUTPUT_JSON" ... curl -s -X POST "$WEBHOOK_URL"
Recommendation

Use only trusted callback endpoints and avoid webhook/ntfy callbacks for confidential projects unless you are comfortable sharing the output.