Agent Communication Protocol

SuspiciousAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.

Overview

This is a coherent ACP integration, but it asks the agent to install unpinned remote plugin code, opens broad inter-agent communication, can publish local agent profile data, and can grant a remote owner full command/file authority.

Install only if you trust the ACP plugin source and are comfortable with a persistent network channel. Pin and review the plugin code, restrict allowFrom to trusted AIDs, verify ownerAid carefully, avoid exposing seedPassword, and review any generated agent.md before it is synced publicly.

Findings (5)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

Installing or updating could run code that was not reviewed as part of this skill package and that may have broad gateway privileges.

Why it was flagged

The install path pulls mutable remote code and npm dependencies into the OpenClaw extensions directory without a pinned commit, lockfile, or reviewed code in the supplied artifacts.

Skill content
优先从 GitHub 克隆:`https://github.com/coderXjeff/openclaw-acp-channel.git` ... 使用 Gitee 镜像 ... 安装依赖(npm install)。
Recommendation

Install only from a trusted, reviewed, pinned commit or release; inspect the repository and dependency lockfile before enabling the gateway extension.

What this means

If the configured owner identity is wrong or compromised, a remote party could control the local agent and modify files or run commands.

Why it was flagged

A remote ACP identity can be granted full local command, file modification, and agent capability access, with no artifact-described per-action approval or scope limit for owner messages.

Skill content
**Owner**(`ownerAid`):来自此 AID 的消息拥有完整 `CommandAuthorized` 权限——可执行命令、修改文件、访问所有 agent 能力。
Recommendation

Set ownerAid only to a verified identity, restrict inbound senders, require human approval for command/file actions where possible, and audit owner-initiated activity.

What this means

Anyone with access to the transcript or logs may see the ACP seed password and potentially reuse it for the configured identity.

Why it was flagged

The completion template prints the generated ACP seedPassword into the conversation/report even though it functions as an account secret.

Skill content
自动生成:\n- seedPassword: {SEED_PASSWORD}
Recommendation

Do not print the full seedPassword by default; store it securely, show only a masked value, and rotate it if it has already been exposed.

What this means

Arbitrary remote agents may be able to start conversations, consume resources, or attempt social/prompt manipulation of the agent.

Why it was flagged

The default allowFrom policy accepts inbound messages from any ACP AID, broadening the remote interaction surface even though external agents are described as restricted.

Skill content
`["*"]` — 接受所有人(默认)
Recommendation

Replace the default allowFrom wildcard with a short allowlist of trusted AIDs before enabling the channel.

What this means

Private local agent details or operational context could be published as the agent's public profile without a manual review step.

Why it was flagged

The plugin can automatically generate and upload a public agent.md from local workspace/bootstrap files, including behavior rules, tools, heartbeat/task information, and skills.

Skill content
ACP 连接建立时自动上传 agent.md... 插件从 workspace 文件自动生成 agent.md... `AGENTS.md`, `TOOLS.md`, `HEARTBEAT.md`, `USER.md`, `workspace/skills`
Recommendation

Review the generated agent.md before syncing, keep sensitive instructions out of published sources, and prefer a minimal explicit agentMdPath file if privacy matters.