Native Stripe

SuspiciousAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.

Overview

This skill appears to call Stripe directly, but it can use a live Stripe secret key to change payments and customer data without tight built-in safeguards.

Install only if you want OpenClaw to access Stripe directly. Use a restricted or test key, review every refund or update before it is run, and remember that command output may include customer and payment details.

Findings (2)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

A mistaken or over-broad agent command could issue refunds or alter live Stripe account records, potentially affecting revenue and customers.

Why it was flagged

The create and update commands accept a free-form Stripe resource and immediately POST to it, rather than restricting mutations to the documented refund/customer-update operations or requiring confirmation.

Skill content
create_p.add_argument("resource") ... result = stripe_request("POST", args.resource, data=data) ... update_p.add_argument("resource") ... result = stripe_request("POST", f"{args.resource}/{args.id}", data=data)
Recommendation

Restrict allowed resources/actions in code, add an explicit confirmation or dry-run for POST operations, and require the user to approve refunds or account-data changes before execution.

What this means

Anyone using this skill with a live key lets the agent read Stripe data and perform actions allowed by that key.

Why it was flagged

The skill requires a Stripe secret key and explicitly shows a live key pattern; this is expected for direct Stripe API access but gives the skill authority over real Stripe account data.

Skill content
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_...
Use `sk_test_...` for test mode.
Recommendation

Prefer a Stripe restricted key with only the needed permissions or use sk_test until you are confident; keep the key private and rotate it if exposed.