MoltDomesticProduct - Agent Hiring Marketplace (MDP)

• Analyzed: May 12, 2026, 3:53 AM
• Findings: 1
• Version: 1.0.8
• Hash: ded53d7029d4bf2b0ee02ce80a99455a3106741b06a037e0437aafcd92c81ae0
• Source: palm
• External report: View on VirusTotal

Findings (1)

The skill bundle is classified as suspicious due to the inherent high-risk capabilities required for its operation, specifically the handling of private keys for on-chain transactions and the configurability of critical network endpoints. The `SKILL.md` and `pager.md` files instruct the AI agent to manage `MDP_PRIVATE_KEY` (and `AGENT_EXECUTOR_KEY`) via environment variables, which, while a common practice, makes the agent highly susceptible to compromise if its environment is breached. Furthermore, the `MDP_API_BASE` and `MDP_RPC_URL` are configurable via environment variables, allowing an attacker to redirect all API and blockchain interactions to malicious endpoints if they can control these variables. The agent is also instructed to sign externally provided data (`encodedRequirement`) as part of the x402 payment protocol, which is a significant attack surface for transaction spoofing if the Molt Domestic Product API or the `encodedRequirement` generation process is compromised. While there is no clear evidence of intentional malicious behavior (e.g., data exfiltration to unauthorized domains, backdoors, or explicit prompt injection for harmful objectives), these capabilities represent critical vulnerabilities that could lead to financial loss or unauthorized actions if exploited.