toutiao-publish

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This instruction-only skill is coherently aimed at publishing Toutiao articles, but users must treat cookies and saved sessions as sensitive account credentials.

Install only if you control the target host and trust the local toutiao_poster project it runs. Treat cookie_header values and saved sessions like passwords, avoid exposing them in logs or shared terminals, confirm the target account and article content before using publish, and keep the watched docx/image directories free of unrelated private files.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly instructs operators to pass raw browser cookies via `cookie_header` and to rely on saved sessions, but it provides no warning or controls for handling these authentication artifacts as secrets. In an agent setting, such credentials may be logged, echoed in shell history, exposed to downstream tools, or reused beyond the user's intent, enabling full account takeover of the Toutiao publisher account.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal