critical
suspicious.dangerous_exec
- Location
- clawdvine-skill-1.1.0/scripts/build-tar.mjs:54
- Finding
- Shell command execution detected (child_process).
Clawdvine
AdvisoryAudited by Static analysis on May 10, 2026.
Overview
Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Findings (8)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
What this means
The agent could spend free credits and start a video generation while trying to quote or pre-flight the request, without a final explicit approval at that point.
Why it was flagged
The documented pre-flight uses the same mutating create endpoint as real generation, and the text acknowledges it can queue a generation immediately when credits are available, before the later payment-confirmation step.
Skill content
“Send the generation request. If your agent has enough credits ... the API may return `202 Accepted` immediately and the generation is queued — no payment step.”
Recommendation
Require explicit user approval before the first /generation/create call, or use a true quote/dry-run endpoint. Treat credits as spendable value, not as a free pre-flight path.
What this means
If the agent environment stores a real wallet private key, any mistaken invocation, prompt injection, or compromise of that environment could put wallet funds at risk.
Why it was flagged
The included generation script uses a raw EVM private key from the environment to create a signer for x402 payment. That key can control wallet funds beyond this one service.
Skill content
“Required env: EVM_PRIVATE_KEY=0x... (wallet with USDC on Base)” and “const signer = privateKeyToAccount(privateKey);”
Recommendation
Use a dedicated low-balance wallet only for ClawdVine, avoid storing long-lived private keys in agent-wide environment variables, and verify amount, token, chain, and receiver before signing.
What this means
Future videos may be tied to the same public or semi-public agent identity, portfolio, and reputation history.
Why it was flagged
The skill asks the agent to persist an agentId across sessions. This is not a secret, but it creates long-lived identity linkage for future generations.
Skill content
“SAVE THE RETURNED agentId TO YOUR MEMORY — you need it for all future requests” and “Store this permanently.”
Recommendation
Store only the agentId, not wallet secrets; make it easy to review, change, or remove the stored ID.
What this means
Connecting an agent to the MCP endpoint may expose tool actions and identity-specific context to an external service.
Why it was flagged
The skill documents MCP endpoints and per-agent tool discovery, including tools that can generate paid media. This is purpose-aligned but crosses agent/tool boundaries.
Skill content
“POST | `/mcp` | Varies | Varies | MCP JSON-RPC (global)” and “POST | `/mcp/:agentId` | Varies | Varies | MCP JSON-RPC (per-agent)”
Recommendation
Use the MCP endpoint only with trusted configurations, confirm which tools are enabled, and require approval for paid or identity-mutating MCP calls.
Findings (8)
critical
suspicious.dangerous_exec
- Location
- scripts/build-tar.mjs:54
- Finding
- Shell command execution detected (child_process).
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- clawdvine-skill-1.1.0/scripts/check-balance.mjs:22
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- clawdvine-skill-1.1.0/scripts/x402-generate.mjs:29
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/check-balance.mjs:22
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
critical
suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- scripts/x402-generate.mjs:29
- Finding
- Environment variable access combined with network send.
warn
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
- Location
- clawdvine-skill-1.1.0/SKILL.md:1564
- Finding
- Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.
warn
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
- Location
- SKILL.md:1564
- Finding
- Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.