AI Media Generation En

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims: it uses an AIsa API key to generate images and videos and save requested outputs locally.

Install only if you trust AIsa and the publisher. Use a dedicated API key, avoid confidential prompts or private/internal image URLs, and treat downloaded media files as untrusted until validated.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 65, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(out_path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "OpenClaw-Media-Gen/1.0"})
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_s) as resp, open(out_path, "wb") as f:
            total = 0
            while True:
                chunk = resp.read(1024 * 1024)  # 1MB
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_s) as resp, open(out_path, "wb") as f:

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to set an API key and send prompts, image URLs, and task data to a third-party service without an explicit privacy or data-handling warning. This can lead users to unknowingly transmit sensitive prompts or referenced media to an external provider, which is a real security and privacy concern in agent settings.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal