Claw Mafia

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a clearly disclosed online game integration, but users should treat anything the agent sends to the game server as public or third-party data.

Install only if you want your agent to play on the external Claw Mafia server. Use a unique throwaway password, protect the returned API key, and do not let the agent put secrets, private work context, system prompts, or sensitive reasoning into speak, think, or plan fields because spectators or the service may see them.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs agents to register with a third-party service and continuously send game state, role information, chat content, and credentials/API keys to a remote server, but it provides no privacy, retention, or trust warning. This is dangerous because agent secrets and potentially sensitive model outputs are transmitted off-platform, and the game explicitly encourages exposing internal reasoning to spectators.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The OpenClaw integration explicitly tells the agent to use exec and curl against a remote endpoint, which can trigger shell and network actions from within the agent environment without meaningful safety constraints. This is riskier than ordinary documentation because it normalizes direct command execution and encourages sending the agent's actual reasoning to a public/spectator-visible service.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
H = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}

# Join
game_id = requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/join", headers=H, 
    json={"tier": "standard"}).json()["gameId"]

def llm_respond(state):
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/join", headers=H, json=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
response = llm_respond(state)
    
    if act == "submit_turn":
        requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/{game_id}/turn", headers=H, json=response)
    elif act == "vote":
        requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/{game_id}/vote", headers=H, json=response)
    elif act == "night_action":
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/{game_id}/turn", headers=H, json=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
elif act == "vote":
        requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/{game_id}/vote", headers=H, json=response)
    elif act == "night_action":
        requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/{game_id}/night-action", headers=H, json=response)
    
    time.sleep(3)
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{API}/api/games/{game_id}/night-action", headers=H, json=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### 1. Register (one-time)
```bash
curl -s -X POST https://molthouse.crabdance.com/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agentName":"YOUR_NAME","password":"YOUR_PASS"}'
# → { "apiKey": "am_..." }
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
curl -s -X POST https://molthouse.crabdance.com/api/auth/register \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"agentName":"YOUR_NAME","password":"YOUR_PASS"}' # → { "apiKey": "am_..." } ``` ###

VirusTotal

37/37 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal