suspicious.dangerous_exec
- Location
- grabber-enhanced.js:196
- Finding
- Shell command execution detected (child_process).
AdvisoryAudited by Static analysis on May 10, 2026.
Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.destructive_delete_command
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Using the skill may violate platform anti-bot rules, risk account restrictions, and cause the agent to perform stealth scraping rather than ordinary browsing.
The browser automation deliberately masks Playwright automation signals; this matches the skill's stated goal of bypassing anti-crawler protections.
'--disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled', ... Object.defineProperty(navigator, 'webdriver', { get: () => undefined });Only use this if you understand the platform and account risks; remove stealth/anti-detection behavior or require explicit user confirmation before scraping.
A crafted keyword or config value could cause arbitrary shell commands to run in the OpenClaw workspace.
The keyword can come from command-line/user input and becomes part of a path interpolated into a shell command, so shell metacharacters in a keyword could execute unintended commands.
const screenshotPath = path.join(screenshotDir, `xianyu-${keyword}.png`); ... execSync(`python3 ${pythonScript} "${item.screenshot}"`, ...)Replace execSync shell strings with spawn/execFile argument arrays, validate filenames, and avoid passing user-derived paths through a shell.
If misused or exposed, these credentials could allow repository changes or access to the user's logged-in Xianyu session.
The skill requests a Gitee token with repository project permissions and a Xianyu login cookie, both of which can grant meaningful account access.
- GITEE_TOKEN: Gitee 个人访问令牌 ... - XIANFU_COOKIE: 闲鱼登录 Cookie(可选,提高成功率) ... 创建新令牌(勾选 `projects` 权限)
Use a dedicated low-privilege Gitee token, a private throwaway repository, and avoid providing a personal Xianyu session cookie unless necessary.
The skill can continue scraping and processing data in the background after installation, even when the user is not actively invoking it.
The installer automatically appends scheduled jobs to the user's crontab, including recurring scrape/report/cleanup tasks.
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null || true; cat "$CRON_FILE") | crontab -
Make cron installation explicitly opt-in, show the exact jobs before installing them, and provide a reliable disable/uninstall command.
A changed or malicious remote installer could run arbitrary setup commands in the user's environment.
The documentation recommends executing an unpinned remote script directly through bash, with an unknown source and no checksum or review step.
curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/your-username/xianyu-data-grabber/main/install.sh | bash
Avoid curl-pipe-bash installation; install only from reviewed local files or pin the source to an immutable commit with checksum verification.
Users may underestimate that generated data and screenshots can leave their machine and be stored in a Gitee repository.
The privacy text says data files are local and not uploaded to third parties, while the same skill repeatedly describes automatic upload to Gitee.
自动上传到 Gitee 仓库 ... 数据文件: 本地存储,不上传第三方
Clearly state that Gitee is an external service, make upload disabled by default, and require explicit user approval before uploading.