Creative Agents

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill matches its creative-agent purpose, but it grants agents social-posting authority, OAuth token handling, local log/history access, and persistent memory writes without clearly documented guardrails.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill access to social accounts and local workspace history. Use least-privilege OAuth scopes, require human review before posting, keep tokens in a keyring rather than plaintext, inspect MEMORY.md changes before committing them, and review any helper skills it discovers and runs.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
High
What this means

An agent using this skill could post or engage from connected social accounts, potentially publishing content the user did not explicitly approve.

Why it was flagged

The skill exposes direct social-media posting and engagement automation, which can create or mutate public account content; the provided instructions do not show a required approval or review step before posting.

Skill content
**Social Media Manager** — posting, monitoring, engagement via Playwright + OAuth ... python3 scripts/social_playwright.py post --platform twitter --content "Hello world" --json
Recommendation

Use test accounts first, require human approval before any post or engagement action, and add clear dry-run/review controls for social publishing workflows.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
High
What this means

Stored or exposed OAuth tokens could allow posting or account access on linked social platforms if mishandled or captured in logs/results.

Why it was flagged

The OAuth handler requests write/offline scopes, persists OAuth tokens, and returns raw token data to callers; this is sensitive delegated account authority and is not clearly bounded by the registry credential metadata.

Skill content
"scopes": "tweet.read tweet.write users.read offline.access" ... self.token_file.write_text(payload) ... return {"ok": True, "token": token_data}
Recommendation

Declare required credentials/scopes, avoid returning raw tokens in JSON outputs, prefer keyring-only storage, and use least-privilege scopes with explicit user consent.

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ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Medium
What this means

Private notes or misleading/instruction-like text could become long-term agent memory and influence future agent behavior.

Why it was flagged

The curator reads daily notes and appends extracted lines into MEMORY.md, creating persistent agent context from local private notes without an evident review step in the artifact.

Skill content
DEFAULT_DAILY_DIRS = [Path("/Users/ghost/.openclaw/workspace/memory"), Path("/Users/ghost/.openclaw/workspace/Notes/daily")] ... with open(target, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh: fh.write(block)
Recommendation

Review proposed memory changes before committing them, restrict input directories, exclude sensitive notes, and periodically inspect or prune MEMORY.md.

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ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Low
What this means

Error reports or summaries may include snippets from private commands, transcripts, or logs.

Why it was flagged

The log analyzer intentionally scans local application logs, Claude transcripts, and shell history; this is purpose-aligned for a scribe agent but may process sensitive local context.

Skill content
self.cursor_log_dir = Path.home() / ".cursor" / "logs" ... self.claude_transcript_dir = Path.home() / ".claude" / "transcripts" ... self.shell_history = self._find_shell_history()
Recommendation

Run log analysis only when needed, inspect outputs before sharing them, and avoid scanning directories that may contain secrets.

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ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Low
What this means

If a discovered helper skill is replaced or untrusted, this integration may execute it as part of normal workflows.

Why it was flagged

The integration discovers and executes other local skill scripts by path. This is aligned with the integration purpose, but those external scripts are outside the provided review context and are not validated here.

Skill content
SKILL_SEARCH_PATHS = [Path.home() / ".claude" / "skills" / "last30days", ... Path.home() / ".local" / "share" / "last30days"] ... result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)
Recommendation

Pin or verify helper skill locations, review the referenced helper skills separately, and avoid relying on writable or unexpected discovery paths.