Create Agent

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to do what it says—create persistent Overclaw agents—but it changes core agent configuration and can read local logs when asked.

Install/use this only if you intend to change Overclaw's agent registry, prompts, and routing. Start with --dry-run, review every changed file, keep new agents least-privileged, and avoid log-based analysis unless you are comfortable with the skill inspecting local logs.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI08: Cascading Failures
Medium
What this means

A mistaken or overly broad new agent could affect how future tasks are routed or executed.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally updates multiple files that affect agent discovery, routing, prompts, and generated context, so a bad configuration could propagate through Overclaw behavior.

Skill content
Integration points updated: `.overstory/config.yaml`, `.overstory/agent-manifest.json`, `.overstory/agent-defs/<name>.md`, `scripts/overclaw_gateway.py`, `task_router.py`, `generate_agent_context.py`, and regeneration
Recommendation

Run with --dry-run first, review diffs to all changed files, and keep backups or use rollback-on-fail for real changes.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Medium
What this means

If broad tools such as Bash or canSpawn are enabled, the new agent may have more authority than intended.

Why it was flagged

The script persists the new agent's tool access, capabilities, spawn permission, and constraints in the agent manifest.

Skill content
agents[name] = {"file": file_name, "model": model, "tools": tools, "capabilities": capabilities, "canSpawn": can_spawn, "constraints": constraints}
Recommendation

Default to read-only constraints, keep canSpawn false unless required, and grant only the specific tools the new agent needs.

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ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution
Low
What this means

Regeneration runs local workspace code, so a compromised or unexpected workspace script would execute during this step.

Why it was flagged

After updating configuration, the script can execute the workspace's generate_agent_context.py to regenerate gateway context.

Skill content
subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(GENERATE_CONTEXT_PATH), "--workspace", str(workspace)], cwd=str(workspace), check=True, capture_output=True)
Recommendation

Use this only in a trusted workspace; review generate_agent_context.py or use --no-regenerate if you do not want the regeneration script run.

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ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Low
What this means

Local logs may contain private operational details; this script appears to summarize locally rather than transmit them.

Why it was flagged

Optional analysis mode reads local OpenClaw log files to suggest possible new agents.

Skill content
OPENCLAW_LOGS = Path.home() / ".openclaw" / "logs" ... for f in sorted(log_dir.glob("*.log"))[:5]: text = _read_text(f, max_chars=50_000)
Recommendation

Run log-based analysis only when you are comfortable letting the skill inspect those local logs, and review suggestions before creating agents from them.