Canonry

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

Canonry is a coherent AEO operations skill, but it handles powerful site and analytics credentials that users must protect carefully.

Install only if you are comfortable giving Canonry access to the specific analytics, search, business-profile, server-log, and WordPress accounts you connect. Treat ~/.canonry/config.yaml as a secrets file: keep it out of git and backups, restrict local permissions, use revocable least-privilege credentials, and restrict Aero to read-only scope when you only want analysis.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to store service credentials in `~/.canonry/config.yaml` and only mentions making a backup before edits, without any guidance on protecting that file with least-privilege permissions, encryption, secret-manager use, or redaction practices. Because this skill handles GA4, server-side traffic, and other integrations, a local plaintext credential store can expose API keys or tokens to other local users, backups, logs, or accidental sharing.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The documentation explicitly directs users to persist a Google OAuth client secret and per-user OAuth tokens in `~/.canonry/config.yaml`, and states those tokens are stored there rather than in a dedicated secret store. Storing long-lived credentials in plaintext on disk without guidance on file permissions, encryption, or OS keychain usage increases the chance of credential theft via local compromise, backups, logs, dotfile sync, or accidental disclosure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The documentation states that WordPress authentication is stored locally in `~/.canonry/config.yaml` but provides no warning about the sensitivity of the application password, file permissions, encryption, or safe handling. Because these credentials grant authenticated WordPress API access, insecure storage or casual copying of the config file could lead to unauthorized page edits or broader CMS compromise depending on the account scope.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal