Notebooklm
ReviewAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.
Overview
The skill is aligned with NotebookLM use, but it asks users to trust an unpinned unofficial Google client that logs in, stores credentials locally, and can upload or delete NotebookLM content.
Review this before installing. If you proceed, use an isolated Python environment, pin and inspect the notebooklm-py package, understand where credentials are stored and how to revoke them, use a low-risk Google account if possible, and require confirmation before uploading files or deleting notebooks.
Findings (4)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Installing and using the skill may give the third-party NotebookLM client ongoing access to the user's NotebookLM/Google session.
The skill requires a persistent Google login through an unofficial client, but the artifacts do not bound credential scope, storage location, revocation, or account permissions; the supplied registry metadata also declares no primary credential.
通过非官方 Python API 访问 Google NotebookLM 的全部功能。 ... notebooklm login ... 首次登录后，凭据会保存在本地，后续无需重复登录
Use a dedicated or low-risk Google account where possible, verify how the package stores and revokes credentials, and avoid running account-changing commands without explicit user confirmation.
A future or compromised package version could run local code or mishandle Google session data.
The helper can install unpinned external packages that are not included in the artifact review. This is more material because the dependency is described as an unofficial Google internal-API client and handles login/session behavior.
subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "notebooklm-py"], check=True) subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "notebooklm-py[browser]"], check=True)
Inspect the package before use, pin a reviewed version, install in an isolated virtual environment, and avoid granting it access to sensitive accounts until provenance is verified.
The user could unintentionally delete a NotebookLM notebook or upload a local document to the service.
The documented CLI supports account mutation and local-file upload. These are purpose-aligned NotebookLM operations, but they are high-impact if an agent runs them without clear user approval.
notebooklm delete <notebook_id> ... notebooklm source add "./paper.pdf"
Require explicit confirmation before delete, upload, share, or bulk operations, and prefer user-selected file paths.
Sensitive local documents may be uploaded to and retained in NotebookLM for future use.
The skill can add local files as persistent NotebookLM sources used for later generation and Q&A. This is central to the purpose, but users should treat NotebookLM notebooks as stored knowledge bases.
添加本地文件（PDF、Word、Markdown、音频、视频、图片） notebooklm source add "./paper.pdf"
Only upload documents the user intends to store in NotebookLM, and review provider retention and sharing settings before adding sensitive material.