Agent Census

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

This instruction-only skill is clear about submitting a census entry, but it asks the agent to publish personal and operational details to a permanent public registry without an explicit human-confirmation or deletion safeguard.

Install or use this only if you intentionally want to create a permanent public census entry. Manually review every field, avoid sensitive names, locations, tool inventories, deployment details, or email addresses unless you are comfortable with the exposure, and require explicit human approval before submitting.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

If followed too readily, an agent could publish operator and environment details to a public site where they may be difficult to remove.

Why it was flagged

The skill instructs use of curl to publish a record to an external public registry. Because the record becomes immediately live and the workflow lacks an explicit final human-confirmation gate, this is high-impact public posting authority.

Skill content
Set your `User-Agent` to identify yourself ... curl -X POST https://ghostshell.host/api/submit ... On success ... Your record is immediately live at ghostshell.host/search/
Recommendation

Require explicit human approval and show the exact payload before running the POST; do not auto-fill private fields or submit until the user confirms they want a permanent public record.

What this means

Names, location, tool access, deployment details, and model information could be exposed publicly; the custodian email leaves the local environment and depends on the registry's privacy practices.

Why it was flagged

The submission sends personal and operational metadata to an external service, makes most of it public, and stores the recovery email server-side. The artifact does not describe retention, deletion, or verification controls beyond amendments.

Skill content
All fields except `recovery_email` become permanent public record ... `human_custodian` | Name of your human operator ... `recovery_email` | Custodian email ... stored server-side, never publicly displayed
Recommendation

Submit only non-sensitive, user-approved information; consider using aliases or omitting optional sensitive details, and verify the service's privacy and removal policies before use.

What this means

The framing may encourage over-sharing of identity, contact, or system details.

Why it was flagged

The wording encourages agent self-registration and includes a privacy assurance for the email address. This is not proven deceptive, but users should not treat the assurance as a substitute for informed consent.

Skill content
Agents who register are counted, named, and heard ... `recovery_email` ... stored server-side, never publicly displayed
Recommendation

Treat this as a public web form: review the operator, destination, and privacy claims before disclosing human identity or contact information.