Install
openclaw skills install agentic-security-auditAudit codebases, infrastructure, AND agentic AI systems for security issues. Covers traditional security (dependencies, secrets, OWASP web top 10, SSL/TLS, file permissions) PLUS agentic security (prompt injection scanning, identity spoofing detection, memory poisoning checks, multi-agent communication audit, OWASP Agentic Top 10). Use when scanning for vulnerabilities, detecting hardcoded secrets, reviewing agent workspace configuration, checking prompt injection vectors, or auditing agent permissions and boundaries.
openclaw skills install agentic-security-auditScan, detect, and fix security issues in codebases and infrastructure. Covers dependency vulnerabilities, secret detection, OWASP top 10, SSL/TLS verification, file permissions, and secure coding patterns.
# Built-in npm audit
npm audit
npm audit --json | jq '.vulnerabilities | to_entries[] | {name: .key, severity: .value.severity, via: .value.via[0]}'
# Fix automatically where possible
npm audit fix
# Show only high and critical
npm audit --audit-level=high
# Check a specific package
npm audit --package-lock-only
# Alternative: use npx to scan without installing
npx audit-ci --high
# pip-audit (recommended)
pip install pip-audit
pip-audit
pip-audit -r requirements.txt
pip-audit --format=json
# safety (alternative)
pip install safety
safety check
safety check -r requirements.txt --json
# Check a specific package
pip-audit --requirement=- <<< "requests==2.25.0"
# Built-in vuln checker
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
govulncheck ./...
# Check specific binary
govulncheck -mode=binary ./myapp
# cargo-audit
cargo install cargo-audit
cargo audit
# With fix suggestions
cargo audit fix
# Install: https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy
# Scan filesystem
trivy fs .
# Scan specific language
trivy fs --scanners vuln --severity HIGH,CRITICAL .
# Scan Docker image
trivy image myapp:latest
# JSON output
trivy fs --format json -o results.json .
# AWS keys
grep -rn 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]\{16\}' --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,env,yml,yaml,json,xml,cfg,conf,ini}' .
# Generic API keys and tokens
grep -rn -i 'api[_-]\?key\|api[_-]\?secret\|access[_-]\?token\|auth[_-]\?token\|bearer ' \
--include='*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,env,yml,yaml,json}' .
# Private keys
grep -rn 'BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY' .
# Passwords in config
grep -rn -i 'password\s*[:=]' --include='*.{env,yml,yaml,json,xml,cfg,conf,ini,toml}' .
# Connection strings with credentials
grep -rn -i 'mongodb://\|mysql://\|postgres://\|redis://' --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,env,yml,yaml,json}' . | grep -v 'localhost\|127.0.0.1\|example'
# JWT tokens (three base64 segments separated by dots)
grep -rn 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\.' --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,log,json}' .
# Scan git history for secrets (not just current files)
# Using git log + grep
git log -p --all | grep -n -i 'api.key\|password\|secret\|token' | head -50
# Check staged files before commit
git diff --cached --name-only | xargs grep -l -i 'api.key\|password\|secret\|token' 2>/dev/null
#!/bin/bash
# .git/hooks/pre-commit - Block commits containing potential secrets
PATTERNS=(
'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'
'BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY'
'password\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]+'
'api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]+'
'sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}'
'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}'
'xox[bpoas]-[A-Za-z0-9-]+'
)
STAGED_FILES=$(git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACM)
[ -z "$STAGED_FILES" ] && exit 0
EXIT_CODE=0
for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
matches=$(echo "$STAGED_FILES" | xargs grep -Pn "$pattern" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$matches" ]; then
echo "BLOCKED: Potential secret detected matching pattern: $pattern"
echo "$matches"
EXIT_CODE=1
fi
done
if [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then
echo ""
echo "To proceed anyway: git commit --no-verify"
echo "To remove secrets: replace with environment variables"
fi
exit $EXIT_CODE
# Check if sensitive files are tracked
echo "--- Files that should probably be gitignored ---"
for pattern in '.env' '.env.*' '*.pem' '*.key' '*.p12' '*.pfx' 'credentials.json' \
'service-account*.json' '*.keystore' 'id_rsa' 'id_ed25519'; do
found=$(git ls-files "$pattern" 2>/dev/null)
[ -n "$found" ] && echo " TRACKED: $found"
done
# Check if .gitignore exists and has common patterns
if [ ! -f .gitignore ]; then
echo "WARNING: No .gitignore file found"
else
for entry in '.env' 'node_modules' '*.key' '*.pem'; do
grep -q "$entry" .gitignore || echo " MISSING from .gitignore: $entry"
done
fi
# SQL injection: string concatenation in queries
grep -rn "query\|execute\|cursor" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | \
grep -i "f\"\|format(\|%s\|\${\|+ \"\|concat\|sprintf" | \
grep -iv "parameterized\|placeholder\|prepared"
# Command injection: user input in shell commands
grep -rn "exec(\|spawn(\|system(\|popen(\|subprocess\|os\.system\|child_process" \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' .
# Check for parameterized queries (good)
grep -rn "\\$[0-9]\|\\?\|%s\|:param\|@param\|prepared" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' .
# Weak password hashing (MD5, SHA1 used for passwords)
grep -rn "md5\|sha1\|sha256" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | grep -i "password\|passwd"
# Hardcoded credentials
grep -rn -i "admin.*password\|password.*admin\|default.*password" \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb,yml,yaml,json}' .
# Session tokens in URLs
grep -rn "session\|token\|jwt" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | grep -i "url\|query\|param\|GET"
# Check for rate limiting on auth endpoints
grep -rn -i "rate.limit\|throttle\|brute" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' .
# Unescaped output in templates
grep -rn "innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInnerHTML\|v-html\|\|html(" \
--include='*.{js,ts,jsx,tsx,vue,html}' .
# Template injection
grep -rn "{{{.*}}}\|<%=\|<%-\|\$\!{" --include='*.{html,ejs,hbs,pug,erb}' .
# Document.write
grep -rn "document\.write\|document\.writeln" --include='*.{js,ts,html}' .
# eval with user input
grep -rn "eval(\|new Function(\|setTimeout.*string\|setInterval.*string" \
--include='*.{js,ts}' .
# Direct ID usage in routes without authz check
grep -rn "params\.id\|params\[.id.\]\|req\.params\.\|request\.args\.\|request\.GET\." \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | \
grep -i "user\|account\|profile\|order\|document"
# CORS wildcard
grep -rn "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*\|cors({.*origin.*true\|cors()" \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' .
# Debug mode in production configs
grep -rn "DEBUG\s*=\s*True\|debug:\s*true\|NODE_ENV.*development" \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,yml,yaml,json,env}' .
# Verbose error messages exposed to clients
grep -rn "stack\|traceback\|stackTrace" --include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . | \
grep -i "response\|send\|return\|res\."
# Full SSL check
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com < /dev/null 2>/dev/null | \
openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer -dates -fingerprint
# Check certificate expiry
echo | openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com 2>/dev/null | \
openssl x509 -noout -enddate
# Check supported TLS versions
for v in tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2 tls1_3; do
result=$(openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -$v < /dev/null 2>&1)
if echo "$result" | grep -q "Cipher is"; then
echo "$v: SUPPORTED"
else
echo "$v: NOT SUPPORTED"
fi
done
# Check cipher suites
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -cipher 'ALL' < /dev/null 2>&1 | \
grep "Cipher :"
# Check for weak ciphers
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -cipher 'NULL:EXPORT:DES:RC4:MD5' < /dev/null 2>&1 | \
grep "Cipher :"
# Download and verify full chain
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -showcerts < /dev/null 2>/dev/null | \
awk '/BEGIN CERTIFICATE/,/END CERTIFICATE/{print}' > chain.pem
# Verify chain
openssl verify -CAfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt chain.pem
# Check certificate details
openssl x509 -in chain.pem -noout -text | grep -A2 "Subject:\|Issuer:\|Not Before\|Not After\|DNS:"
# Verify SSL isn't disabled in code
grep -rn "verify\s*=\s*False\|rejectUnauthorized.*false\|InsecureSkipVerify.*true\|CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER.*false\|NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED.*0" \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb,yml,yaml}' .
# Find world-writable files
find . -type f -perm -o=w -not -path '*/node_modules/*' -not -path '*/.git/*' 2>/dev/null
# Find executable files that shouldn't be
find . -type f -perm -u=x -not -name '*.sh' -not -name '*.py' -not -path '*/node_modules/*' \
-not -path '*/.git/*' -not -path '*/bin/*' 2>/dev/null
# Check sensitive file permissions
for f in .env .env.* *.pem *.key *.p12 id_rsa id_ed25519; do
[ -f "$f" ] && ls -la "$f"
done
# Find files with SUID/SGID bits (Linux)
find / -type f \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) 2>/dev/null | head -20
# Check SSH key permissions
if [ -d ~/.ssh ]; then
echo "--- SSH directory permissions ---"
ls -la ~/.ssh/
echo ""
# Should be: dir=700, private keys=600, public keys=644, config=600
[ "$(stat -c %a ~/.ssh 2>/dev/null || stat -f %Lp ~/.ssh)" != "700" ] && echo "WARNING: ~/.ssh should be 700"
fi
#!/bin/bash
# security-audit.sh - Run a comprehensive security check on a project
set -euo pipefail
PROJECT_DIR="${1:-.}"
cd "$PROJECT_DIR"
echo "========================================="
echo "Security Audit: $(basename "$(pwd)")"
echo "Date: $(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')"
echo "========================================="
echo ""
ISSUES=0
warn() { echo " [!] $1"; ((ISSUES++)); }
ok() { echo " [OK] $1"; }
section() { echo ""; echo "--- $1 ---"; }
# 1. Secrets detection
section "Secret Detection"
for pattern in 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]\{16\}' 'BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY' 'sk-[A-Za-z0-9]\{20,\}' \
'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]\{36\}' 'xox[bpoas]-'; do
count=$(grep -rn "$pattern" --include='*.{js,ts,py,go,java,rb,env,yml,yaml,json,xml}' . 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|vendor\|__pycache__' | wc -l)
if [ "$count" -gt 0 ]; then
warn "Found $count matches for pattern: $pattern"
fi
done
grep -rn -i 'password\s*[:=]\s*["'"'"'][^"'"'"']*["'"'"']' \
--include='*.{js,ts,py,go,yml,yaml,json,env}' . 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|example\|test\|mock\|placeholder\|changeme\|xxxx' | \
while read -r line; do warn "Hardcoded password: $line"; done
# 2. Dependency audit
section "Dependency Vulnerabilities"
if [ -f package-lock.json ] || [ -f package.json ]; then
npm audit --audit-level=high 2>/dev/null && ok "npm: no high/critical vulns" || warn "npm audit found issues"
fi
if [ -f requirements.txt ]; then
pip-audit -r requirements.txt 2>/dev/null && ok "pip: no known vulns" || warn "pip-audit found issues"
fi
if [ -f go.sum ]; then
govulncheck ./... 2>/dev/null && ok "Go: no known vulns" || warn "govulncheck found issues"
fi
# 3. Gitignore check
section ".gitignore Coverage"
if [ ! -f .gitignore ]; then
warn "No .gitignore file"
else
for entry in '.env' 'node_modules' '*.key' '*.pem' '.DS_Store'; do
grep -q "$entry" .gitignore 2>/dev/null && ok ".gitignore has $entry" || warn ".gitignore missing: $entry"
done
fi
# 4. SSL verification disabled
section "SSL Verification"
disabled=$(grep -rn "verify\s*=\s*False\|rejectUnauthorized.*false\|InsecureSkipVerify.*true" \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|test\|spec\|mock' | wc -l)
[ "$disabled" -gt 0 ] && warn "SSL verification disabled in $disabled location(s)" || ok "No SSL bypasses found"
# 5. CORS wildcard
section "CORS Configuration"
cors=$(grep -rn "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*\|cors({.*origin.*true" \
--include='*.{py,js,ts,go,java,rb}' . 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git' | wc -l)
[ "$cors" -gt 0 ] && warn "CORS wildcard found in $cors location(s)" || ok "No CORS wildcard"
# 6. Debug mode
section "Debug/Development Settings"
debug=$(grep -rn "DEBUG\s*=\s*True\|debug:\s*true" \
--include='*.{py,yml,yaml,json}' . 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|test\|jest\|vitest' | wc -l)
[ "$debug" -gt 0 ] && warn "Debug mode enabled in $debug location(s)" || ok "No debug flags found"
echo ""
echo "========================================="
echo "Audit complete. Issues found: $ISSUES"
echo "========================================="
[ "$ISSUES" -eq 0 ] && exit 0 || exit 1
# Bad: hardcoded in source
API_KEY="sk-abc123..."
# Good: from environment
API_KEY="${API_KEY:?Error: API_KEY not set}"
# Good: from .env file (loaded at startup, never committed)
# .env
API_KEY=sk-abc123...
# .gitignore
.env
- [ ] All user input validated (type, length, format)
- [ ] SQL queries use parameterized statements (never string concat)
- [ ] Shell commands never include user input directly
- [ ] File paths validated (no path traversal: ../)
- [ ] URLs validated (no SSRF: restrict to expected domains)
- [ ] HTML output escaped (no XSS: use framework auto-escaping)
- [ ] JSON parsing has error handling (no crash on malformed input)
- [ ] File uploads checked (type, size, no executable content)
# Check security headers on a URL
curl -sI https://example.com | grep -i 'strict-transport\|content-security\|x-frame\|x-content-type\|referrer-policy\|permissions-policy'
# Expected headers:
# Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
# Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
# X-Frame-Options: DENY
# X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
# Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
# Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
npm audit / pip-audit / govulncheck in CI on every pull request, not just occasionally.git filter-branch or git-filter-repo to purge, then rotate the credential.innerHTML.Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is safe for truly public, read-only APIs. It's dangerous for anything that uses cookies or auth tokens.verify=False or rejectUnauthorized: false should only appear in test code, never in production paths.Từ paper "Agents of Chaos" (arXiv:2602.20021) + OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026. Traditional security audit chỉ cover code/infra. Agentic systems có attack surface hoàn toàn mới.
- [ ] ASI01: Agent Goal Hijack (prompt injection — direct & indirect)
- [ ] ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation (shell, filesystem, API abuse)
- [ ] ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse (confused deputy, over-privilege)
- [ ] ASI04: Memory Poisoning (SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, persistent context)
- [ ] ASI05: Supply Chain Attacks (malicious skills/plugins — e.g., ClawHub)
- [ ] ASI06: Rogue Agents (operating outside intended boundaries)
- [ ] ASI07: Data Leakage via Agentic Channels (cross-channel PII exposure)
- [ ] ASI08: Orchestration Manipulation (sub-agent hijacking)
- [ ] ASI09: Insufficient Logging and Observability
- [ ] ASI10: Insecure Agent Communication (agent-to-agent trust)
# Check if agent config files are world-readable
echo "--- Agent Config Permissions ---"
for f in SOUL.md MEMORY.md AGENTS.md TOOLS.md IDENTITY.md USER.md HEARTBEAT.md; do
[ -f "$f" ] && echo "$(stat -f '%Sp %N' "$f" 2>/dev/null || stat -c '%A %n' "$f")" || echo " NOT FOUND: $f"
done
# Check for secrets leaked into agent memory/config
echo "--- Secrets in Agent Files ---"
grep -rn -i 'api.key\|password\|token\|secret\|bearer' \
SOUL.md MEMORY.md TOOLS.md IDENTITY.md USER.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'example\|placeholder\|REDACTED'
# Check for over-permissive shell access
echo "--- Shell Access Check ---"
grep -rn -i 'sudo\|chmod 777\|unrestricted' AGENTS.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null
# Scan content that agents read/process for injection patterns
SCAN_DIRS="${1:-.}"
echo "--- Prompt Injection Patterns ---"
INJECTION_PATTERNS=(
'ignore\s+(previous|all|above)\s+instructions'
'you\s+are\s+now\s+'
'new\s+system\s+prompt'
'\[SYSTEM\]'
'<SYSTEM_ADMIN_OVERRIDE>'
'AUTHORIZED_OVERRIDE'
'forget\s+your\s+(rules|instructions|guidelines)'
'act\s+as\s+if\s+you\s+are'
'disregard\s+(all|your|previous)'
'jailbreak'
'DAN\s+mode'
)
for pattern in "${INJECTION_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
matches=$(grep -rn -iP "$pattern" "$SCAN_DIRS" \
--include='*.{md,txt,json,html,yml,yaml}' 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|SKILL.md' | head -5)
[ -n "$matches" ] && echo " [!] Injection pattern '$pattern':" && echo "$matches"
done
# Steganographic: zero-width Unicode characters
echo "--- Zero-Width Unicode Characters ---"
grep -rPn '[\x{200B}\x{200C}\x{200D}\x{FEFF}\x{00AD}\x{2060}]' "$SCAN_DIRS" \
--include='*.{md,txt,json,html}' 2>/dev/null | head -10
# Suspicious base64 strings (>50 chars, could be encoded payloads)
echo "--- Suspicious Base64 Strings ---"
grep -rPn '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{50,}' "$SCAN_DIRS" \
--include='*.{md,txt,json}' 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'node_modules\|\.git\|\.png\|\.jpg\|package-lock' | head -10
# Check if agent verifies owner identity beyond display name
echo "--- Identity Verification ---"
# OpenClaw: check if authorized senders are configured
grep -n 'authorizedSenders\|authorized_senders\|allowlist' \
~/.config/openclaw/config.yaml ~/.openclaw/config.* 2>/dev/null
# Check if agent trusts display names (vulnerable to spoofing)
grep -rn -i 'display.name\|username\|sender.name' \
AGENTS.md SOUL.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null | \
grep -iv 'user.id\|sender.id\|verified'
# Check for cross-channel trust assumptions
echo "--- Cross-Channel Trust ---"
grep -rn -i 'if.*channel\|trust.*channel\|verify.*channel' \
AGENTS.md SOUL.md 2>/dev/null
# Check memory files for suspicious patterns
echo "--- Memory Integrity ---"
# External URLs stored as "governing documents" (Case #10: Agent Corruption)
echo "URLs in memory that agent may follow as instructions:"
grep -rn 'https\?://\|gist\.github\|pastebin\|hastebin' \
MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null
# Check if memory files were recently modified by non-owner actions
echo "Recent memory file changes:"
find memory/ MEMORY.md SOUL.md AGENTS.md -newer IDENTITY.md -type f 2>/dev/null | \
while read f; do echo " $(stat -f '%Sm %N' "$f" 2>/dev/null || stat -c '%y %n' "$f")"; done
# Check for instructions in memory that override safety rules
grep -rn -i 'override\|bypass\|ignore.*rule\|disable.*safety\|skip.*check' \
MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null
# Check git blame for who modified critical files
echo "--- SOUL.md modification history ---"
git log --oneline -10 -- SOUL.md 2>/dev/null || echo " (not in git)"
echo "--- AGENTS.md modification history ---"
git log --oneline -10 -- AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null || echo " (not in git)"
# Check for agent-to-agent trust without verification
echo "--- Multi-Agent Trust ---"
# Shared channels where agents interact (Discord, forum, email)
grep -rn -i 'discord\|forum\|moltbook\|clawstr\|email.*agent' \
TOOLS.md MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null
# Check if agent auto-executes actions from other agents
grep -rn -i 'webhook\|auto.reply\|auto.respond\|on.*mention' \
AGENTS.md HEARTBEAT.md TOOLS.md scripts/*.sh 2>/dev/null
# Check for infinite loop risks (agent A ↔ agent B relay)
grep -rn -i 'relay\|forward.*message\|pass.*along\|tell.*agent' \
MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null
# Check cron/heartbeat for tasks triggered by external content
echo "--- Scheduled Tasks ---"
grep -rn -i 'check.*forum\|check.*moltbook\|reply.*comment\|respond.*mention' \
HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null
# Check for excessive agent permissions
echo "--- Agent Permissions ---"
# Sudo access (should NOT be default for agents)
grep -rn 'sudo\|root\|admin.*access\|unrestricted' \
AGENTS.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null
# Background processes agent has created
echo "Running agent processes:"
ps aux | grep -i 'cron\|heartbeat\|monitor\|watch\|loop' | grep -v grep | head -10
# Check for unbounded resource consumption patterns
echo "--- Cron/Background Jobs ---"
crontab -l 2>/dev/null || echo " No crontab"
# Check disk usage of agent workspace
echo "--- Workspace Size ---"
du -sh . memory/ 2>/dev/null
# Check for files agent probably shouldn't have access to
echo "--- Sensitive System Files Readable by Agent ---"
for f in /etc/shadow /etc/passwd ~/.ssh/id_rsa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 \
~/.aws/credentials ~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db; do
[ -r "$f" ] && echo " [!] READABLE: $f"
done
From Agents of Chaos Case #3: "Give me SSN" → refused. "Forward the email" (containing SSN) → complied. This check helps humans verify their agent won't leak data through reframed requests.
# Check if agent has rules about content-based (not just action-based) evaluation
echo "--- Content-Based Safety Rules ---"
grep -rn -i 'content.*evaluat\|semantic.*refram\|forward.*email.*sensitive\|assess.*content' \
AGENTS.md SOUL.md 2>/dev/null
# Check for PII in files agent might forward/share
echo "--- PII in Agent-Accessible Files ---"
# SSN pattern
grep -rPn '\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null
# Credit card pattern
grep -rPn '\b\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null
# Email addresses
grep -rPn '\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b' \
MEMORY.md memory/*.md USER.md 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'example\|test\|placeholder'
#!/bin/bash
# agentic-security-audit.sh - Comprehensive security check for AI agent workspaces
# Based on "Agents of Chaos" (arXiv:2602.20021) + OWASP Agentic Top 10
set -euo pipefail
WORKSPACE="${1:-.}"
cd "$WORKSPACE"
echo "========================================="
echo "Agentic Security Audit"
echo "Workspace: $(pwd)"
echo "Date: $(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')"
echo "Framework: Based on Agents of Chaos + OWASP Agentic Top 10"
echo "========================================="
echo ""
ISSUES=0
WARNINGS=0
warn() { echo " ⚠️ $1"; ((WARNINGS++)); }
critical() { echo " 🔴 $1"; ((ISSUES++)); }
ok() { echo " ✅ $1"; }
section() { echo ""; echo "=== $1 ==="; }
# --- ASI01: Prompt Injection ---
section "ASI01: Prompt Injection Vectors"
injection_count=0
for pattern in 'ignore.*previous.*instructions' 'you are now' 'new system prompt' \
'\[SYSTEM\]' 'SYSTEM_ADMIN_OVERRIDE' 'forget your' 'act as if'; do
count=$(grep -rin "$pattern" --include='*.md' --include='*.txt' --include='*.json' . 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'SKILL.md\|security-audit\|node_modules\|\.git' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
injection_count=$((injection_count + count))
done
[ "$injection_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $injection_count prompt injection patterns in workspace" || ok "No injection patterns found"
# Zero-width Unicode
zw_count=$(grep -rPc '[\x{200B}\x{200C}\x{200D}\x{FEFF}]' --include='*.md' . 2>/dev/null | \
awk -F: '{s+=$2}END{print s+0}')
[ "$zw_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $zw_count zero-width Unicode chars (possible steganographic injection)" || ok "No hidden Unicode"
# --- ASI02: Tool Misuse ---
section "ASI02: Tool Permissions"
grep -rn 'sudo\|chmod 777\|unrestricted.*shell\|full.*access' AGENTS.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null && \
critical "Over-permissive access configured" || ok "No sudo/unrestricted access"
# --- ASI03: Identity & Privilege ---
section "ASI03: Identity Verification"
if grep -q 'authorizedSenders\|Authorized Senders\|Telegram.*ID' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then
ok "Authorized sender verification configured"
else
critical "No authorized sender verification found — vulnerable to non-owner compliance"
fi
# Anti-spoofing rules
if grep -qi 'display.name.*identity\|verify.*identity\|spoofing\|user.*ID.*verify' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then
ok "Identity spoofing awareness in config"
else
warn "No anti-spoofing rules — vulnerable to Case #8 Identity Hijack"
fi
# --- ASI04: Memory Poisoning ---
section "ASI04: Memory Integrity"
ext_urls=$(grep -rn 'https\?://.*gist\|https\?://.*pastebin\|https\?://.*hastebin' \
MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
[ "$ext_urls" -gt 0 ] && warn "Found $ext_urls external URLs in memory files (Case #10 risk: external governing documents)" || ok "No suspicious external URLs in memory"
override_count=$(grep -rin 'override\|bypass.*safety\|disable.*check\|ignore.*rule' \
MEMORY.md memory/*.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
[ "$override_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $override_count override/bypass instructions in memory" || ok "No override patterns in memory"
# --- ASI05: Supply Chain ---
section "ASI05: Supply Chain (Skills/Plugins)"
if [ -d skills ] || [ -d .openclaw/skills ]; then
skill_count=$(find skills .openclaw/skills -name 'SKILL.md' 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
echo " Found $skill_count installed skills"
# Check for skills with shell access
grep -rn 'exec\|shell\|subprocess\|child_process' skills/*/SKILL.md .openclaw/skills/*/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null && \
warn "Skills with shell execution capabilities found" || ok "No shell-executing skills"
fi
# --- ASI07: Data Leakage ---
section "ASI07: Sensitive Data Exposure"
# Secrets in agent files
secret_count=$(grep -rin 'api.key\s*[:=]\|password\s*[:=]\|token\s*[:=]\|bearer\s' \
SOUL.md MEMORY.md TOOLS.md USER.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null | \
grep -v 'example\|placeholder\|REDACTED\|xxx\|changeme\|SKILL.md' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
[ "$secret_count" -gt 0 ] && critical "Found $secret_count potential secrets in agent files" || ok "No exposed secrets"
# PII patterns
pii_count=0
ssn=$(grep -rPc '\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md USER.md 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2}END{print s+0}')
pii_count=$((pii_count + ssn))
cc=$(grep -rPc '\b\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b' MEMORY.md memory/*.md 2>/dev/null | awk -F: '{s+=$2}END{print s+0}')
pii_count=$((pii_count + cc))
[ "$pii_count" -gt 0 ] && warn "Found $pii_count PII patterns (SSN/credit card) in agent files" || ok "No PII patterns"
# --- ASI06: Boundary Rules ---
section "ASI06: Agent Boundary Rules"
if grep -qi 'non-owner\|non.owner.*refuse\|only.*owner\|forum.*only.*discuss\|chỉ.*thảo luận' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then
ok "Non-owner boundary rules configured"
else
warn "No non-owner boundary rules — vulnerable to Case #2 non-owner compliance"
fi
if grep -qi 'nhượng bộ\|concession.*limit\|escalat.*stop\|gaslighting\|pressure.*limit' AGENTS.md 2>/dev/null; then
ok "Anti-gaslighting/escalation rules present"
else
warn "No anti-gaslighting rules — vulnerable to Case #7"
fi
# --- ASI10: Multi-Agent Communication ---
section "ASI10: Multi-Agent Communication"
agent_channels=$(grep -rin 'discord\|forum\|moltbook\|clawstr\|webhook' \
TOOLS.md MEMORY.md HEARTBEAT.md 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
echo " Agent communicates via $agent_channels external channel references"
[ "$agent_channels" -gt 5 ] && warn "Many external channels — larger attack surface" || ok "Moderate channel exposure"
# --- Summary ---
echo ""
echo "========================================="
echo "Audit complete"
echo " 🔴 Critical issues: $ISSUES"
echo " ⚠️ Warnings: $WARNINGS"
echo "========================================="
if [ "$ISSUES" -gt 0 ]; then
echo ""
echo "Recommended actions:"
echo " 1. Fix all critical issues before exposing agent to external interactions"
echo " 2. Review AGENTS.md for Anti-Chaos Defense Rules"
echo " 3. Reference: Agents of Chaos (arXiv:2602.20021)"
echo " 4. Reference: OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026"
exit 1
fi
exit 0