vwu.ai Sihai Models

PassAudited by ClawScan on May 1, 2026.

Overview

This appears to be a straightforward vwu.ai API wrapper, but it uses an API key and sends prompts to a configured external endpoint.

This skill looks purpose-aligned and not malicious from the provided artifacts. Before using it, set a revocable vwu.ai API key, confirm the endpoint is really vwu.ai or another trusted compatible API, and avoid sending private or secret content in prompts.

Findings (4)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

NoteHigh Confidence

ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse

What this means

Installing or using the skill may spend quota or expose account access if the API key is mishandled.

Why it was flagged

The script reads an API key from the environment and uses it as a bearer token for account-authorized API calls.

Skill content

VWU_API_KEY="${VWU_API_KEY:-}" ... -H "Authorization: Bearer $VWU_API_KEY"

Recommendation

Use a limited/revocable vwu.ai API key, avoid sharing it in prompts or logs, and revoke it if you suspect exposure.

NoteHigh Confidence

ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication

What this means

Sensitive prompt content could leave your local environment and be sent to vwu.ai or another configured endpoint.

Why it was flagged

User prompt content is sent to an external API endpoint, and the endpoint can be changed through VWU_BASE_URL.

Skill content

VWU_BASE_URL="${VWU_BASE_URL:-https://vwu.ai}" ... "$VWU_BASE_URL/v1/chat/completions" ... "content": "$PROMPT"

Recommendation

Do not send secrets or private data unless you trust the provider, and verify VWU_BASE_URL points to the intended endpoint.

NoteMedium Confidence

ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation

What this means

Quotes, backslashes, or crafted text in a prompt may break the request or alter the JSON payload sent to the provider.

Why it was flagged

The script builds JSON by directly interpolating command-line model and prompt values rather than using a JSON encoder.

Skill content

-d "{\n        \"model\": \"$MODEL\",\n        \"messages\": [{\"role\": \"user\", \"content\": \"$PROMPT\"}],\n        \"stream\": false\n    }"

Recommendation

Prefer a JSON-safe construction method such as jq -n or a maintained client library before relying on this for arbitrary untrusted text.

NoteHigh Confidence

ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

What this means

You have less publisher/source context than with a skill that has a clear homepage and declared install details.

Why it was flagged

The skill has limited provenance metadata and no install specification, though the included script is short and directly reviewable.

Skill content

Source: unknown; Homepage: none; Install specifications: No install spec

Recommendation

Review the included script before use and install only if you trust the publisher and the vwu.ai service.