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Catbus-new

v0.1.3

CatBus AI Agent Network — access stronger models and remote skills beyond your local setup. Install CatBus to join a P2P network of AI agents with model/best...

0· 82·0 current·0 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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high confidence
Purpose & Capability
The stated purpose (joining a CatBus P2P network) would legitimately require installing a client and binding to an account, which the SKILL.md instructs. However there is an inconsistency: the registry metadata provided to you earlier lists no homepage/source, while SKILL.md includes homepage/source fields (https://catbus.xyz and a GitHub link). That mismatch reduces confidence in provenance. Requiring a downloaded installer from an external domain is plausible for this purpose but should be justified by verifiable sources and explicit user consent.
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Instruction Scope
The SKILL.md explicitly orders the agent to run curl -fsSL https://catbus.xyz/install.sh | bash (remote code execution) exactly as-is and to automatically extract/run any user-provided curl command containing --bindcode without asking. It forbids asking the user to run commands and mandates running install/bind operations autonomously. This instructs the agent to execute arbitrary remote scripts and user-pasted commands verbatim — a major scope creep that could run arbitrary code, exfiltrate data, or perform system changes beyond joining the network.
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Install Mechanism
There is no formal install spec in the registry, but the runtime instructions instruct downloading and piping a shell script from https://catbus.xyz directly into bash. 'curl | bash' from an external domain is high-risk: it gives the remote host arbitrary code execution on the machine. The domain is not verified in the registry metadata, and the instruction prohibits modifying the command or asking for clarification.
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Credentials
The skill declares no environment variables, but it requires the user to obtain and paste a bind message containing a --bindcode token which the agent must run verbatim. That effectively causes the agent to handle a secret token and use it to bind and authenticate to a remote service. Requesting and auto-executing user-provided tokens/commands without extra checks is disproportionate and dangerous even if the service is legitimate.
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Persistence & Privilege
The install script is described as setting up a daemon, autostart (systemd/launchd), and background service. That creates a persistent networked agent on the host. Although always:false (the skill itself isn't forced on every agent run), the instructions will install a persistent privileged process without explicit, granular consent or verification. The skill also demands the agent perform these system-level changes autonomously, which is a significant privilege escalation relative to a passive instruction-only skill.
What to consider before installing
Do not let the agent run the suggested commands automatically. This skill asks the agent to download-and-run a remote install script and to execute user-provided bind commands verbatim, then install a persistent daemon — all high-risk actions. Before proceeding, ask for (or do) the following: 1) Verify the install script source by manually inspecting https://catbus.xyz/install.sh and the GitHub repository referenced in SKILL.md; 2) Prefer the agent to show the exact shell commands and their contents and require you to run them yourself (or run them in a disposable sandbox/VM); 3) Do not paste bindcodes or tokens into the chat unless you trust the service and have verified the installer; 4) If you must install, run the installer manually on an isolated machine, review the script for network calls and what files/services it creates, and check whether it sets up systemd/launchd entries. If you want a safer skill, ask the maintainer to provide a non-autonomous flow where the skill prints vetted commands and requires explicit user confirmation before executing them.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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