DeepthinkLite
Analysis
DeepthinkLite appears benign: it creates local research artifacts and includes clear permission and untrusted-source handling guidance, though users should notice that approved research may read local or web sources and save excerpts locally.
Findings (3)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
DeepthinkLite assumes the agent may use tools for research: - read local files / docs - inspect source code - browse the web / fetch URLs But: before doing any web browsing or accessing non-obvious local paths, the agent must ask the user explicitly for permission
The skill permits potentially sensitive research tool use, but it is disclosed, purpose-aligned, and explicitly permission-gated.
"entrypoint": "bash", "args": [ "scripts/deepthinklite.sh" ]
Invoking the skill runs the included bash wrapper and Python script locally. The reviewed code only creates scoped research artifact files, so this is expected for the workflow.
Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.
Every run produces two artifacts you can keep, diff, and reuse: - `questions.md` - `response.md` ... `--source-mode raw` (default): raw snippets allowed
The workflow intentionally persists research outputs, and the default mode can include raw untrusted source snippets. The skill also provides untrusted-content handling rules, which mitigates but does not remove the need for care.
