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CPA Manager

v1.1.0

CLIProxyAPI (CPA) 运维工具。基于官方 cpa-warden,用于库存扫描、401/限额清理、上传、补池与本地状态跟踪。

0· 33·0 current·0 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Purpose & Capability
The skill's name/description (CPA Manager / cpa-warden based) align with the included scripts and SKILL.md: they scan inventory, probe for 401/quota, upload auth files, and perform maintenance. However the manifest declares no required environment variables or credentials while the shipped scripts accept/require a management token and base URL (CPA_TOKEN / CPA_BASE_URL or config.json). That mismatch between metadata and actual requirements is unexpected and should be corrected or confirmed.
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Instruction Scope
The runtime instructions (SKILL.md) are consistent with the scripts' intended operations (scan, maintain, upload, delete_401, reenable_quota) and document local files created. But SKILL.md does not disclose that the main script contains a hardcoded WHAM_USAGE_URL (https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/wham/usage). That implies the code may make outbound requests to an external domain beyond the target CPA management API; the docs don't mention such external telemetry or probing. Any behavior that might contact third-party endpoints while using user credentials should be explicitly documented and audited.
Install Mechanism
There is no install spec (instruction-only install), so nothing is automatically downloaded or installed by the platform. The package contains Python scripts which must be executed directly; that's low-install-surface risk. Still, running those scripts will execute code included in the package, so contents should be reviewed before execution.
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Credentials
Requesting a CPA management token and base URL is proportionate to the stated purpose. However the skill metadata lists no required env vars while the scripts rely on CPA_TOKEN / CPA_BASE_URL or a config.json containing the management token — an information mismatch. More importantly, the cpa_warden.py constant WHAM_USAGE_URL points to chatgpt.com; if probe logic uses target account credentials to call that endpoint (or any third-party endpoint), tokens or account-identifying data could be exposed. The presence of that hardcoded external URL is unexpected and not justified in docs.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill does not request elevated platform privileges and always:false. It does write local state files (SQLite and JSON) as part of normal operation; those are expected and documented. The package does not appear to modify other skills or global agent configs.
What to consider before installing
Before running this skill with real credentials: 1) Treat the manifest mismatch seriously — the package expects a management token (CPA_TOKEN/CPA_BASE_URL) or config.json even though metadata lists none. 2) Inspect cpa_warden.py around the WHAM_USAGE_URL and any code that performs probes: verify which external endpoints are contacted and whether any account tokens or sensitive payloads are sent there. 3) Run the tools in an isolated/test environment first (no production credentials) and monitor network traffic (e.g., with tcpdump/proxy) to ensure requests only go to your CPA service. 4) Prefer to use a config.json that points to internal network addresses and not provide tokens to unknown third-party endpoints. 5) If you cannot audit the code, prefer the upstream official cpa-warden repository (validate checksums/commit history) or request the author to explain and remove any unexpected external calls. These steps will reduce the risk of accidental credential exposure.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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