Skill Evolver

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent and purpose-aligned, but it can install, audit, invoke, and create persistent skills, so users should approve those lifecycle changes carefully.

This skill appears safe to install from the provided artifacts, but use it deliberately: approve any registry skill installation, verify sources before global npm/npx or clawhub actions, review generated deletion commands before running them, and audit any newly created or fused skills before future use.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Medium
What this means

Installing remote skills or global CLIs can add new code and agent capabilities to your environment.

Why it was flagged

The workflow may install global CLI tooling and remote registry skills. This is central to the skill’s lifecycle-manager purpose, but it introduces normal third-party package and registry trust risk.

Skill content
npm i -g clawhub ... npx skills add <slug> -g -y ... clawhub install <slug>
Recommendation

Only install skills and CLIs from sources you trust, review the selected slug/source before approving, and prefer pinned or verified sources when available.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
Medium
What this means

If the generated removal command is copied or run without review, it could delete more than intended if the path is wrong.

Why it was flagged

On a rejected audit, the script writes a recursive deletion command into the report. It does not execute the command itself, and removing a rejected skill is purpose-aligned, but the path should be checked before anyone runs it.

Skill content
f"rm -rf {skill_path}"
Recommendation

Before running any generated removal command, confirm the path is exactly the intended skill directory and not a parent, home, or system directory.

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ASI10: Rogue Agents
Medium
What this means

A newly created skill can persist beyond the current task and influence future agent behavior.

Why it was flagged

The workflow can materialize a successful workflow into a new persistent skill. The artifact includes a user decision checkpoint, making this disclosed and purpose-aligned.

Skill content
A: Yes, create a new skill (invoke `skill-creator`)
Recommendation

Create or fuse a skill only after confirming the scope, then inspect and audit the generated skill before relying on it.

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ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Low
What this means

Sensitive details from the task could remain in local output files after the session.

Why it was flagged

The workflow writes task intent, candidate analysis, inspection notes, and orchestration plans to local files. This is expected for repeatable workflow management, but those files may contain sensitive task context.

Skill content
output `${OUTPUT_DIR}/01-intent.md` ... `${OUTPUT_DIR}/03-inspection.md` ... `${OUTPUT_DIR}/04-orchestration.md`
Recommendation

Avoid placing secrets in task descriptions and clean up the output directory when the workflow artifacts are no longer needed.

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ASI09: Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
Low
What this means

A skill that passes the regex audit could still have risks not covered by the scanner.

Why it was flagged

The audit gate is based on pattern scanning in scripts/audit_skill.py. That is useful as a first pass, but a pass should not be treated as a complete security guarantee.

Skill content
PASS: No high-risk patterns → Skill ready to use
Recommendation

Treat the automated audit as a screening step and still review unfamiliar skills, especially before installing or invoking them.