Pilot Github Bridge

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is purpose-aligned, but it exposes a public webhook-to-agent bridge that can trigger other agents without documented authentication, signature validation, or lifecycle controls.

Review before installing or using. This skill fits its GitHub-to-Pilot bridge purpose, but do not expose the relay publicly until you have verified GitHub webhook signatures, limited which repositories and event types can trigger agents, reviewed the relay server code, and added clear start/stop controls.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

#
ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Medium
What this means

If the relay accepts spoofed or unauthorized requests, outside parties could cause Pilot agents to receive fake repository events and potentially trigger automated workflows.

Why it was flagged

The workflow exposes a public relay and subscribes Pilot agents to GitHub events, but the artifacts do not show authentication, GitHub webhook signature validation, or subscriber permission boundaries.

Skill content
pilotctl --json daemon start --hostname github-relay --public
python3 github_relay_server.py &
...
pilotctl --json subscribe localhost github-events
Recommendation

Only deploy the relay with verified GitHub webhook signatures, TLS, restricted network access, clear subscriber permissions, and logging of event origins.

#
ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
Low
What this means

Repository events may automatically start builds or reviews, consuming resources or activating workflows without further human confirmation.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally uses webhook-derived data to send messages to other agents. This matches the stated CI/CD bridge purpose, but it is still automation that can cause downstream actions.

Skill content
[ "$BRANCH" = "main" ] && pilotctl --json send-message ci-builder --data "{\"action\":\"build\",\"repo\":\"$REPO\"}"
...
[ "$ACTION" = "opened" ] && pilotctl --json send-message code-reviewer --data "{\"repo\":\"$REPO\",\"pr\":$(echo "$EVENT" | jq -r '.number')}"
Recommendation

Keep downstream agent actions scoped, require approvals for high-impact operations, and filter events by repository, branch, sender, and action type.

#
ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Low
What this means

Users must obtain or write the relay server separately, and an unsafe relay implementation could mishandle webhook payloads or authentication.

Why it was flagged

The instructions depend on an external relay server script, but no such code is included in the provided artifact set for review.

Skill content
# Start HTTP relay (external Python server)
python3 github_relay_server.py &
Recommendation

Review the relay server code before running it, pin its source/version, and ensure it validates GitHub webhook signatures before forwarding events.

#
ASI10: Rogue Agents
Low
What this means

The bridge may keep listening and processing events until the user manually stops it, including after the original task is complete.

Why it was flagged

The workflow starts background services and an indefinite event loop. This is expected for a webhook bridge, but the artifact does not include shutdown or cleanup guidance.

Skill content
pilotctl --json listen 1005 &
...
python3 github_relay_server.py &
...
while true; do
  EVENT=$(pilotctl --json recv 1005 --timeout 120s)
Recommendation

Run it under a supervised service with explicit start/stop commands, least-privilege permissions, and documented cleanup steps.