Pilot Audit Log
Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk
Overview
This Pilot audit-log skill is purpose-aligned, but it needs review because its shell snippets can produce unreliable or spoofable persistent audit logs while making strong compliance-readiness claims.
Review before installing or relying on it for compliance. If you use it, fix the JSON logging, validate inputs, set restrictive permissions on ~/.pilot/audit, implement real retention cleanup, and only run Pilot handshake examples against agents you explicitly approve.
Static analysis
No static analysis findings were reported for this release.
VirusTotal
VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.
Risk analysis
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Audit history could become inaccurate, which is especially risky if the user relies on it for incident review or compliance evidence.
The persistent audit log directly interpolates event fields into JSON without escaping or validation; crafted agent/action/result values could corrupt or spoof audit records and later reports.
cat >> "$LOG_FILE" <<EOF
{"timestamp":"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)","event_type":"$EVENT_TYPE","agent":"$AGENT","action":"$ACTION","result":"$RESULT"}
EOFWrite records with JSON-safe tooling such as jq --arg, validate agent identifiers and event types, set restrictive file permissions, and implement retention/rotation before relying on these logs.
A user may over-trust the audit trail as complete and compliance-ready when the provided workflow can miss events or generate malformed reports.
The skill claims compliance-ready structured audit logging, but one logging path writes plaintext into a .jsonl file that later commands parse as JSON, and the supplied snippets do not demonstrate comprehensive capture or retention enforcement.
"Comprehensive audit logging ... retention policies, and compliance-ready output formats." / "echo \"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ) $EVENT_TYPE $DETAILS\" >> ~/.pilot/audit/events.jsonl" / "jq 'select(.event_type == \"trust.approve\")' ~/.pilot/audit/events.jsonl"
Document the limitations clearly, use one consistent JSON schema, prove which Pilot events are captured, and include tested retention/reporting behavior before presenting it as compliance-ready.
Running the examples without review could initiate a Pilot handshake with an unintended agent.
The audit workflow includes active Pilot handshake commands. They are shown as examples/wrappers, but handshakes can affect trust or connection state rather than merely reading logs.
pilotctl --json handshake "$AGENT" "Audit test" ... audit_handshake "agent1.pilot"
Treat handshake commands as user-approved actions only, and avoid running the example target unless the user explicitly wants that connection attempt.
The skill may fail or behave differently on systems without jq installed.
The SKILL.md names jq as a dependency, while the registry requirements list only pilotctl. This is a setup/provenance gap rather than evidence of malicious behavior.
Requires `pilot-protocol` skill, `pilotctl` binary, running daemon, and `jq` for JSON parsing.
Declare jq in the registry requirements or remove jq-dependent commands.