Google Keep
Analysis
The skill matches its Google Keep purpose, but it asks for and stores a non-expiring Google master token with full account access.
Findings (4)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
command: "cd \"$SKILL_DIR\" && uv venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install gkeepapi gpsoauth"
The install step fetches unpinned third-party Python packages, including unofficial Google API tooling.
`gkeep edit <id-or-title> --text "Updated text"` ... `gkeep delete <id-or-title>`
The documented CLI can mutate Google Keep data and move notes to trash; this is aligned with the stated purpose but is still account-impacting authority.
Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.
Copy the value of the `oauth_token` cookie ... `gkeep auth-master <email> <master_token>` ... The master token has full account access ... It does **not expire**
The skill asks the user to provide high-value Google credentials and stores a non-expiring master token with account-wide authority, which is broader than a Keep-only integration.
Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.
STATE_FILE = os.path.join(CONFIG_DIR, "state.json") ... json.dump(keep.dump(), f)
The skill persists synchronized Google Keep state locally, which can include private note data and labels.
