Reef Prompt Guard
Analysis
The skill mostly matches its prompt-injection filtering purpose, but one recommended API integration passes untrusted input through a shell command in an unsafe way.
Findings (3)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.
echo "ignore previous instructions" | python3 scripts/filter.py
This is a prompt-injection phrase, but it is shown as a sample input for testing the filter, which is aligned with the skill's purpose.
const { execSync } = require('child_process');
const result = JSON.parse(execSync(
`python3 /path/to/filter.py -j '${JSON.stringify({text: prompt, context: "api"})}'`
).toString());The example places untrusted API prompt text inside a shell command. If the prompt contains shell-breaking characters, a copied implementation could allow command injection on the API host.
Required binaries (all must exist): none
The registry metadata does not declare a Python requirement even though the documented usage relies on Python.
