Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
AI Harness Engineering
v1.0.0AI驾驭工程错题本:记录OpenClaw所有被验证的错误、幻觉、缺陷、失误,形成可追溯错误台账,驱动模型自省与进化。 触发场景: (1) 用户纠正OpenClaw的回答("不对"/"错了"/"应该是"/"Actually"等) (2) OpenClaw回答与事实不符,被用户指出 (3) 代码错误、逻辑错误被验证...
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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The name/description (record errors, inject summaries, pre-answer checks, promote learnings) matches the included scripts and data files. The code implements the described features (recording ledgers, pre-answer checks, session injection, auto-promotion). However the promote workflow writes into the user's ~/.qclaw/workspace, which is outside the skill directory — that's a broader filesystem scope than a pure read-only ledger and is worth noting.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md and scripts instruct the agent to: (a) inject a summary on session start, (b) run a pre-answer check for each answer, and (c) perform scheduled auto_promote tasks. The scripts only read/write local files (no network calls) and perform text/JSON processing. They do not appear to access unrelated system credentials or external endpoints. Attention: recorded entries (wrong_answer/correct_answer/details) may contain user-provided text (potentially secrets) and the skill stores and later injects that text into context and workspace files.
Install Mechanism
No install spec or remote downloads; code is included in the skill bundle. No external packages or network fetches are used by the provided scripts. Risk from the install mechanism is low because nothing is pulled from arbitrary URLs.
Credentials
The skill declares no required environment variables, binaries, or external credentials. The scope of requested environment/credentials is proportional to the declared purpose.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill sets always: true and the metadata defines automated cron tasks (every 2h and weekly). Combined with code that auto-promotes entries into ~/.qclaw/workspace and injects summaries into every session, this gives the skill persistent, autonomous execution and the ability to modify files in the user's home. Always: true is a high privilege — benign for some system integrations but unnecessary for many skills and increases abuse potential. The promote script can create/append to files under the user's home; if ledger entries include attacker-controlled content, those values can be written into workspace files.
Scan Findings in Context
[pre-scan-injection-none] expected: No pre-scan injection signals were detected. This is consistent with the skill being local-file-based and not contacting external endpoints.
What to consider before installing
What to consider before installing:
- Persistency and automatic runs: This skill is configured always: true and defines scheduled tasks (every 2 hours, weekly). That means it may run or be injected into sessions automatically without per-session opt-in. If you prefer to control when it runs, ask the publisher to remove always: true or disable cron schedules.
- File writes to your home/workspace: The promote feature writes to ~/.qclaw/workspace (SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, TOOLS.md, MEMORY.md). Back up that directory first and review the promote.py logic; consider running promote operations only in dry-run mode until you trust the content.
- Data sensitivity: The ledger stores user-provided text (wrong_answer, correct_answer, details). Those strings can be later injected into session context or appended to workspace files. If you or users sometimes paste credentials/secrets into conversations, this skill could persist them. Consider limiting who can trigger record_error, or sanitize logs before promoting.
- Review and audit the code: The included scripts are readable and local — review promote.py, record_error.py, inject_summary.py, and pre_answer_check.py to verify they behave as you expect. In particular, check how 'suggested_target' is derived before it is used as a filename in promote_to_workspace to avoid unexpected file paths.
- Least privilege: If you want the functionality but with lower risk, ask for these changes: remove always: true, make cron tasks optional (manual or admin-enabled), restrict promote targets to a single controlled directory, and add input sanitization and size limits to ledger entries.
Overall: the skill is coherent with its stated purpose (not overtly malicious) but the combination of always: true, automatic scheduling, and ability to write into the user's workspace/home makes it higher risk than a read-only helper. Review and possibly harden policies before enabling it in production accounts.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Runtime requirements
🔧 Clawdis
