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v1.0.0

Halo Blog Manager

ReviewClawScan verdict for this skill. Analyzed May 1, 2026, 8:30 AM.

Analysis

The skill appears aligned with managing a Halo blog, but it stores blog credentials/session cookies locally and can publish or delete public blog content, so it needs careful review before use.

GuidanceOnly install this if you are comfortable giving the skill access to manage your Halo blog account. Before use, consider changing it to use a safer credential store, deleting ~/halo-manager/config.json and session.json when no longer needed, and requiring explicit confirmation before publishing, deleting, uploading, or moderating content.

Findings (3)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

Abnormal behavior control

Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.

Tool Misuse and Exploitation
SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern
SKILL.md
| Create post | POST | `/posts` |
| Update post | PUT | `/posts/{name}` |
| Delete post | DELETE | `/posts/{name}` |

The skill exposes high-impact blog mutation operations, including public publishing and deletion, but the instructions do not require explicit user confirmation or a safety preview before destructive/public actions.

User impactIf invoked too broadly or on the wrong resource, the agent could publish unintended content, overwrite posts, delete posts/media, or moderate comments incorrectly.
RecommendationRequire explicit confirmation for create/update/delete/publish/upload/comment moderation actions, show the target blog and resource name, preview content before publishing, and prefer drafts or reversible changes by default.
Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
SeverityLowConfidenceMediumStatusNote
scripts/halo_login.py
import requests
from Cryptodome.PublicKey import RSA
from Cryptodome.Cipher import PKCS1_v1_5

The included helper depends on third-party Python packages, but the skill has no install spec or pinned dependency declaration. No automatic installation is shown, so this is a provenance/dependency hygiene note rather than direct malicious behavior.

User impactUsers may need to install dependencies manually and should ensure they install trusted, current packages.
RecommendationProvide a clear requirements file or install spec with pinned versions and provenance guidance.
Permission boundary

Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.

Identity and Privilege Abuse
SeverityHighConfidenceHighStatusConcern
scripts/halo_login.py
config = {
        "blog_url": blog_url.rstrip("/"),
        "username": username,
        "password": password
    }
    with open(CONFIG_FILE, "w") as f:
        json.dump(config, f, indent=2)

The helper writes the raw Halo password to a local JSON file, giving persistent account access rather than using a scoped token, keychain, or one-time login flow.

User impactAnyone or any process that can read the local config file could potentially access the Halo blog account, and the skill can reuse those credentials later.
RecommendationAvoid storing the raw password; use a credential manager, environment variable, or scoped token if Halo supports it. Declare the credential/config paths in metadata and document how users can revoke or delete stored access.