Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
Siluzan Tso
v1.1.8当判断用户可能需要以下功能时可以使用siluzan-tso这个skillGoogle,Bing,Yandex,Tiktok,Kwai等广告账户的开户,账号数据分析共享/取消共享、Google MCC 绑定/解绑、Meta BM 绑定、TikTok BC 绑定/解绑TikTok 关闭、暂停 Google 账户撤回、...
⭐ 1· 123·0 current·0 all-time
bySiluzan Dev@sigedev01-bit
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
Capability signals
These labels describe what authority the skill may exercise. They are separate from suspicious or malicious moderation verdicts.
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
Name/description, report templates, and references all describe ad-account opening, sharing, MCC/BM/BC binding, diagnostics, and report generation — the included files support that purpose and are internally consistent with the stated functionality.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md repeatedly instructs the agent to run the 'siluzan-tso' CLI, to read CLI config (e.g., 'config show' for tsoApiBaseUrl / Token), to poll async tasks, and to use '--json' + 'node -e' filtering. It also enforces a policy of executing commands on the user's behalf and not exposing those CLI commands to the user. These instructions require the agent to access local config/credentials and to execute code, which is broader than what's declared and could hide critical actions from the user.
Install Mechanism
There is no install spec and no code files that will be written/executed by the platform; the skill is instruction-only, which is low risk from an installer perspective.
Credentials
Registry metadata declares no required env vars or binaries, yet runtime docs reference TSO API base URL and a Token in config, assume a 'siluzan-tso' CLI and Node for JSON filtering, and imply access to account-level operations (open/close/bind/unbind invoices/transfers). Requiring account control and tokens without declaring them is disproportionate and opaque.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false (normal) and autonomous invocation allowed by default. That is expected. However, because the skill's instructions expect the agent to run privileged CLI operations on ad accounts and explicitly hide those CLI commands from the user, the autonomous execution capability increases the blast radius — this combination heightens the need for transparency about what credentials and endpoints the agent will use.
What to consider before installing
What you should consider before installing:
- The skill is instruction-only and matches its ad-management/reporting description, but its runtime steps assume access to a 'siluzan-tso' CLI, Node, and a TSO API token/config — none of which are declared in the registry metadata. Ask the publisher to document exactly which binaries and environment variables (or config files) the skill will use, where tokens are stored, and which network endpoints will be contacted.
- The SKILL.md requires the agent to execute CLI commands on your behalf and forbids exposing those commands to you (except login). That means the agent could perform account-level changes (bind/unbind, open/close, invoice actions) without you seeing the exact commands. Only proceed if you trust the operator and can audit actions (logs, command history, or an approval workflow).
- Confirm whether the 'siluzan-tso' CLI is already installed by your operator or whether installing it is required (and, if so, obtain a vetted install source). Verify token handling: prefer short-lived tokens, explicit scopes, and audit logs; avoid providing full account/owner credentials unless necessary.
- The HTML report templates reference external CDNs (Google fonts, jsdelivr, echarts); if you render generated HTML, that may cause outbound network requests. If you need offline or sensitive reporting, require local assets or whitelist domains.
- If you want to proceed: request (1) a minimal list of required binaries and env vars, (2) the exact endpoints/tsoApiBaseUrl the skill calls, (3) a description of what account operations the agent will perform, and (4) an audit/logging mechanism or manual approval step for destructive actions. Without that information, treat the skill as suspicious and avoid granting it account credentials or blanket execution privileges.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
