v0.1.0

Loopuman

ReviewClawScan verdict for this skill. Analyzed May 1, 2026, 5:41 AM.

Analysis

Review before installing: this skill can use a stored Loopuman API key to create paid tasks for external human workers and share task content without clear approval, budget, or privacy guardrails.

GuidanceInstall only if you want the agent to outsource work to Loopuman human workers. Before any task is created, confirm the exact description, budget, worker count, and whether it contains private data; protect the API-key config file and avoid sending secrets or regulated information.

Findings (3)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

Abnormal behavior control

Checks for instructions or behavior that redirect the agent, misuse tools, execute unexpected code, cascade across systems, exploit user trust, or continue outside the intended task.

Tool Misuse and Exploitation

SeverityMediumConfidenceHighStatusConcern

scripts/loopuman.sh

budget_vae: $budget_vae, estimated_seconds: $estimated_seconds, max_workers: $max_workers, priority: $priority ... response=$(api POST "/api/v1/tasks" -d "$payload")

The create command submits paid human-worker tasks with caller-controlled budget, worker count, and priority. The artifacts do not show a built-in confirmation step, budget cap, or approval requirement before this account-mutating action.

User impactIf invoked too broadly, the agent could consume Loopuman credits and send tasks to outside workers before the user has reviewed the cost and content.

RecommendationRequire explicit user approval before every create action, set conservative budget and worker limits, and review the task description before submission.

Permission boundary

Checks whether tool use, credentials, dependencies, identity, account access, or inter-agent boundaries are broader than the stated purpose.

Identity and Privilege Abuse

SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote

scripts/loopuman.sh

API_KEY=$(jq -r '.apiKey' "$CONFIG_FILE") ... -H "x-api-key: $API_KEY"

The script reads a local Loopuman API key and uses it as delegated account authority for API calls. This is expected for the service, but it is still a sensitive credential.

User impactAnyone or any agent process with access to this config can act against the Loopuman account and potentially spend available credits.

RecommendationStore the API key carefully, restrict access to the config file, rotate the key if exposed, and install only if you are comfortable granting this account authority.

Sensitive data protection

Checks for exposed credentials, poisoned memory or context, unclear communication boundaries, or sensitive data that could leave the user's control.

Insecure Inter-Agent Communication

SeverityLowConfidenceHighStatusNote

SKILL.md

Route tasks to verified human workers worldwide via Loopuman ... workers operate via Telegram and WhatsApp

Task content is intentionally routed outside the local agent to Loopuman and human workers, with possible messaging-platform involvement. This is purpose-aligned and disclosed, but it creates a data-sharing boundary users should notice.

User impactPrivate, confidential, or regulated information included in a task description may be seen by external workers or service infrastructure.

RecommendationDo not include secrets, credentials, unnecessary personal data, or confidential business information in tasks; use webhooks only to trusted endpoints.