Multi-Party Agent Wallet
v1.0.11Operate and automate threshold multisignature workflows for MPC/MPA wallets on an isolated, dedicated host that contains no unrelated sensitive data or priva...
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byPatrick Curé@patrickcure
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
Capability signals
These labels describe what authority the skill may exercise. They are separate from suspicious or malicious moderation verdicts.
OpenClaw
Benign
high confidencePurpose & Capability
The name/description (operate automated MPC/MPA workflows) matches the declared requirements: a management API URL, management key path, local MPA repo/config path, Foundry/EVM tooling (forge/cast), and files under $MPA_PATH. None of the required env vars, binaries, or config paths appear unrelated to running and managing an mpc-auth node.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs the agent to operate only against the local management API ($MPC_AUTH_URL:$MANAGEMENT_PORT), the chain RPCs configured by the node, and local files under $MPA_PATH and AUTH_KEY_PATH. It explicitly forbids reading unrelated secrets or sending data to third-party endpoints. The runtime instructions to load $MPA_PATH/.env, check GET /health, and perform KeyGen flows are consistent with purpose.
Install Mechanism
No install spec (instruction-only) — nothing is downloaded or written by an installer. This reduces install-time risk. Note: because there are no code files, the scanner had no code to analyze; the runtime behavior is entirely defined by the provided prose and local repo referenced by $MPA_PATH.
Credentials
Requested env vars and config paths are relevant (management key path, configs.yaml, .env, API URL, management port). However, the management key file ($AUTH_KEY_PATH/mpc_auth_ed25519) is high-value signing material: giving an agent access to it is a privileged action by design. This is proportionate for an automated mpc-auth node, but operators must run on an isolated host, confirm key ownership, and accept the risk that the agent can perform authenticated management actions.
Persistence & Privilege
always=false and no install scripts or system-wide modifications are declared. The skill does assume it can be invoked by the agent (default) but does not request permanent/always-on privileges beyond normal operation.
Assessment
This skill appears to be what it claims: an agent-side helper for operating an mpc-auth node and creating/executing threshold multisignature requests. Before installing, verify the following: 1) Run it only on a dedicated, air-gapped or tightly network-restricted host that contains no other secrets; the skill expects direct access to the management private key file and that access grants the agent signing capability. 2) Ensure at least one human-controlled node remains in the threshold+1 group so the agent cannot unilaterally sign critical transactions. 3) Confirm $MPA_PATH points to the vetted repository referenced in the docs and review any helper scripts under that path (they will be executed or referenced at runtime). 4) Ensure STRICT file permissions on AUTH_KEY_PATH and consider hardware-backed keys or additional human approvals for high-value operations. 5) Because this is instruction-only, there is no installer to audit; review the referenced ContinuumDAO docs and any local scripts before trusting the agent with production funds. If you cannot guarantee host isolation and procedural safeguards, do not grant the agent access to the management key.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Runtime requirements
OSLinux
Binscurl, jq, forge, cast, python3, pip3
EnvKEYGEN_ID, AUTH_KEY_PATH, MPA_PATH, MPC_CONFIG_PATH, MPC_AUTH_URL, MANAGEMENT_PORT
Config$AUTH_KEY_PATH/mpc_auth_ed25519, $MPC_CONFIG_PATH/configs.yaml, $MPA_PATH/.env
Primary envMPC_AUTH_URL